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ABSTRACT 
Most misquotations are owing to carelessness or willful misrepresentation and perpetuated by 
ignorance.  More interesting, however, are those that persist despite being widely recognized as 
erroneous.  Such memes are culturally selected for, and this can be explained by what I call the SIC 
hypothesis:  compared with their originals, such misquotations are uniquely symbolic (S), 
improving (I), or compressive (C).  In such cases, a loss of fidelity is compensated by aesthetic 
enhancement.  But the apparent conflict between truth and beauty here evaporates as these are 
not simply misquotations, paraphrases, or interpolations but a different phenomenon entirely, 
which prompts the coinage of “epiquotation” (n) or some such neologism, together with 
punctuational revision.  As tropes, epiquotations are quotation-adjacent, true to the presumed 
spirit of their originals, unique mnemonic keys, and aesthetic frames; and though they are 
extrinsic, they become essential addenda to the originals, which prompt yet fail to realize such 
potential expression.  So construed, the epiquote phenomenon has paradoxical implications for 
retroactively describing the original works whose cultural reception has deemed them 
epiquotable.   
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Truth 
Aesthetics 
Trope 
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FRED MADISON:      I like to remember things …. How I remember them. 
Not necessarily the way they happened. 
—David Lynch and Barry Gifford, Lost Highway (1997)1 
 
 
Beauty is truth, truth beauty…. 
—John Keats, “Ode on a Grecian Urn” (1819)2 
 
 
 
As a kind of stubborn misquotation, what I call “epiquotation” is different from 
typical misquotation.  In typical misquotation, one is careless or malicious in 
misrepresenting the original text or speech, and if the incorrect version 
proliferates, it is from ignorance or laziness.  Typical misquotations are dull and 
contrast sharply with the interesting examples I will discuss.  “Play it again, Sam” is 
a paradigm case, plausibly the most memorable movie line that never was.  The 
actual lines in Casablanca are “Play it, Sam.  Play ‘As Time Goes By,’” and “Play it.  You 
played it for her, you can play it for me.”3  As with epiquotations generally, “Play it 
again, Sam” persists in our imagination and culture despite being widely 
recognized as erroneous.  Here I will limit discussion chiefly to works of literature 
and film, though much of what I say about such cases will also apply to 
misquotations of political figures and other celebrities where the misquote 
somehow fits them better than their actual words, like an off-the-rack suit 
subsequently tailored.   
Stressing the misquotational aspect of these locutions will obscure crucial 
differences between them and typical misquotations.  Indeed, we arguably distort 
the phenomenon if we insist on any currently standard classification:  to call them 
(mis)quotations fails to capture their aesthetic stubbornness; to call them 
paraphrases fails to acknowledge that they come close to quotations; to call them 
interpolations — as in “Play it [again, Sam]” — fails to render either their holistic 
character or their conventional status.  These locutions are quotation-adjacent, 
true to the presumed spirit of their originals, unique mnemonic keys, and aesthetic 
frames, and this indicates a phenomenon whose concept is becoming clearer as 
our vocabulary lags behind.  It is to fill this gap that I offer the neologism 
Epiquotation 
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“epiquotation” (n) — as in “To epiquote Casablanca, ‘Play it again, Sam.’”  Note the 
apt connotations:  like epigraphs, epiquotations are separate from the work but 
help to frame it; like epiphenomena, they are byproducts; like epilogues, they come 
afterward; like epicondyles, they are outgrowths that anchor further attachments.   
 Certain cases to be discussed are described in What They Didn’t Say: A Book of 
Misquotations, understandably enough as mere misquotations.  The book’s 
introductory essay characterizes these locutions as “wrongly remembered sayings” 
that “represent unconscious editing” and become “part of our general vocabulary,” 
sometimes even having “achieved iconic status.”4  The essay’s tone suggests that 
the persistence and sheer number of such misquotations indicates an amusing 
aspect of human fallibility.  This is apt to leave a misleading impression that such 
locutions are merely a type of misquotation perpetuated by laziness or ignorance.  
But this impression obscures what is operative in and interesting about 
epiquotations.   
 Consider Woody Allen’s play and the subsequent movie Play It Again, Sam.  
Allen’s choice of this title might be interpreted as echoing What They Didn’t Say in 
lampooning our tendency to misremember quotations and remember 
misquotations.  Indeed, the film’s tagline is “Here’s laughing at you, kid.”  However, 
despite the humor, it is clear that for Allen’s character and Allen himself the 
misquotation conjures a poignant nostalgia for Casablanca that echoes that in the 
film.  In other words, Allen’s use of “Play it again, Sam” is decidedly not a product of 
his ignorance or his derision of other people’s.  There is something else going on. 
To be clear, although I am more interested in the aesthetic aspects of 
epiquotations, the imperfections of human memory are often also involved.  “Play 
it again, Sam” persists in many people’s minds because they mistakenly think the 
line occurs in the film.  But it also much more tellingly sticks in the minds of people 
who know better, and this is because though it is wrong as a quotation, it gets 
something right about the film.  It is the stubborn appeal of epiquotations to those 
who know that they are not quotations that is especially intriguing.  Still, it seems 
highly likely that most epiquotations originate in faulty memories, that their origin 
is not deliberate.  Their aesthetic appeal, however, is not only a significant factor in 
their cultural persistence, but it is also no doubt unconsciously at work in helping 
to motivate and shape the original mismemories on which epiquotations often 
depend.  We can speculate about what psychological mechanisms may underlie 
such aesthetic distortion.   
 Setting aside more psychoanalytically oriented approaches, which 
nonetheless may be worth exploring, one way in is through meme theory.  Memes 
are units of cultural selection, including “tunes, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, 
ways of making pots or of building arches ….  [M]emes propagate themselves in the 
Jason Holt 
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meme pool by leaping from brain to brain.”5  As memes, epiquotations are both 
mutations of their originals and culturally selected for:  successful replication 
errors.  Generally speaking, a meme will tend to proliferate because it has value.  
For instance, a recipe will become more popular the tastier the dish.  Likewise, a 
more efficient technique for performing some necessary task will tend to catch on.  
Consider this not the survival of the fittest but “the virality of the catchiest.”  
Although I find this meme-theoretic perspective helpful, nothing in what follows 
necessarily hinges on it.   
 As memes, tunes and catch-phrases — including epiquotations — often 
catch on not because of their immediate utility but because of their aesthetic value.  
I propose that epiquotations are stubborn because — and to the extent that — 
they aesthetically enhance their sources in a way that the original quotations do 
not.  This intuition underlies the SIC hypothesis:  epiquotations are aesthetically 
enhancing because they are uniquely symbolic (S), improving (I), or compressive 
(C).  This hypothesis is meant to be doubly inclusive in that these are held to be the 
principal but not necessarily the only properties that feed into the aesthetic appeal 
of epiquotations and also in that a single epiquotation may exhibit more than one 
of them.  Thus the SIC hypothesis concerns properties of epiquotations that we 
tend to respond to aesthetically.  If an epiquotational meme goes viral, this will 
largely be the result of its aesthetic appeal, and such appeal, according to the SIC 
hypothesis, will often be due to at least one of the three hypothesized functions:  
symbolic, improving, or compressive. 
 Let us start with the symbolic function.  Consider “Elementary, my dear 
Watson,” which is nowhere to be found in the Sherlock Holmes novels and stories 
by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, though it is a staple of pop-cultural references to the 
great detective.  The aesthetic appeal of this misquotation lies in its serving as an 
elegant symbol, evoking immediately Holmes and Watson, the manner of their 
relationship, Holmes’ intelligence and detective work, and typical turns in 
conversation and plot.  Having a similar function is the infamous “Beam me up, 
Scotty” not from Star Trek, which as a symbol helps define the television series.  
Such a line would be inferior as part of the show’s dialogue since for one reason 
formal communication protocol — in Star Trek as in real life typically — begins with 
first contact and identification (e.g., “Kirk to Scotty”) and is only then followed by 
orders (e.g., “Beam me up”), not the reverse.   
Somewhat differently, the phrase “the road less traveled,” which is neither 
in nor the title of Frost’s “The Road Not Taken,” uniquely represents the poem’s key 
image as perhaps the metaphor for finding one’s own path.  Similarly, the altered “A 
rose by any other name would smell as sweet” epitomizes its general point better 
than Shakespeare’s original “That which we call a rose by any other word would smell 
Epiquotation 
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as sweet.”6  In fact, both the Frost and the Shakespeare misquotations along with 
“Beam me up, Scotty” are arguably acontextual improvements on their originals; 
although the originals are not inferior in their original contexts, they do prove 
inferior for use in other contexts, that is, as symbols of the relevant works or their 
key ideas.  An epiquotation that serves as a better symbol apart from the work 
often would have been an aesthetically poorer choice in the original work than the 
actual quote.    
This, however, suggests the second way epiquotations can be aesthetically 
enhancing:  by constituting genuine improvements of their originals.  For a literary 
example, take “Ask not for whom the bell tolls” or “Do not ask for whom the bell 
tolls,” both of which seem to improve on the original from Donne:  “[N]ever send to 
know for whom the bell tolls.” 7  It might seem hubris to think our misquotation 
poetically superior to the original line from the great metaphysical poet.  However, 
although “No Man Is an Island” is often presented as a poem, it is a prose passage 
from one of Donne’s Devotions.8  We cannot fault Donne for prose that rings of 
imperfect poetics to the modern ear.  Indeed, the “Ask not” and “Do not ask” 
misquotations are part of how we appreciate Donne’s passage as if it were a poem.   
 Other, less controversial examples of epiquotational improvement suggest 
themselves.  Alice in Wonderland would have been a better title than Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland.  The unqualified “Greed is good” would have suited Wall 
Street’s ruthless Gordon Gekko better than “[G]reed, for lack of a better word, is 
good.” 9  Or consider, frequently misremembered from Sunset Boulevard, “I’m ready 
for my closeup, Mr. DeMille.”  We prefer this mismemory because the original is 
aesthetically inferior:  “All right, Mr. DeMille, I’m ready for my closeup.” 10  This may 
seem an unjustified preference, yet recall the principle of composition that 
recommends leaving new information till the end of a sentence.11  As Norma 
Desmond (Gloria Swanson) emerges to face a wall of news cameras, “I’m ready for 
my closeup” should prime us for the delusional revelation — “Mr. DeMille.”   
Last, some epiquotations prove stubborn because they compress a lot of 
information.  Take “Alas, poor Yorick!  I knew him well,” a misrendering of Hamlet’s 
“Alas, poor Yorick!  I knew him, Horatio.”  Here the misquotational “well” elegantly 
condenses Hamlet’s subsequent description:  “a fellow of infinite jest, of most 
excellent fancy.  He hath borne me on his back a thousand times….  Here hung 
those lips that I have kissed I know not how oft.  — Where be your gibes now?  Your 
gambols?  Your songs?  Your flashes of merriment that were wont to set the table 
on a roar?” 12  Similarly, “Slipped the surly bonds of earth and touched the face of 
God” takes elements from the first and last lines of the poem “High Flight,” in effect 
compressing the entire poem between its evocative, well-matched bookends.  
Consider “nasty, brutish, and short” from Hobbes, though not a true misquotation, 
Jason Holt 
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as compressing the more complete “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”13  
Further, the quintessential “Play it again, Sam” compresses various elements of 
Casablanca:  the song “As Time Goes By,” its emotional significance, the nightclub 
setting, the Rick and Sam relationship, the romance and nostalgia of the 
subsequent flashback — indeed, the whole of Casablanca itself.   
 Epiquotations reflect the well-worn tension between truth and beauty, 
“true” indicating that a claim “corresponds to reality” (as in the schema “‘P’ is true if 
and only if P”), a reality often plain and ugly and thus in those cases neither 
naturally nor aesthetically beautiful.  These locutions as misquotations are not true 
to their originals; they get the words wrong.  Since they are not strictly part of those 
works, it is false to claim that they are.  However, as stubborn, they do get 
something right.  They aesthetically enhance their sources from without, and so 
they need not be seen as competing with or an affront to the original lines or works 
or our memories of them.  Their aesthetic appeal does come at the price of lost 
fidelity, and they thus run afoul of Keats’ paradoxical truth–beauty equation.  
However, in a way epiquotations actually exemplify the Keats equation.  In step 
with the Lost Highway epigraph, they inform how we like to remember the works 
they get wrong even where we correctly remember the actual words.  They frame 
their sources for our aesthetic pleasure in ways that no actual quotation could do 
nearly as well.  Despite the hazard of distortion then, they express for those sources 
both our appreciation and our respect.  Thus epiquotations, though not true to the 
letter of their originals, are true to the spirit or presumed spirit of their originals, 
fitting if unfit.   
It might seem, however, that endorsing epiquotations imperils our 
epistemic duties, that we do wrong by truth by doing right by beauty.  “Elementary, 
my dear Watson” is in the spirit of Sherlock Holmes, but it can mislead people into 
falsely believing that such a line occurs in the Conan Doyle corpus.  So it might 
seem that by their beauty epiquotations seduce us into perpetuating ignorance.  
But even though strict quotation is often important (in scholarship, journalism, 
etc.), we often overemphasize the need for it in other contexts.  For example, for 
most conversational purposes in making such reference, “Luke, I am your father” 
will suffice though the actual, far less recognizable line is “No, I am your father.” 14  
One can appreciate an “Elementary, my dear Watson” or a “Play it again, Sam” 
without being deceived or misleading others about the source.  Indeed, “Play it 
again, Sam” — as apropos of but not in Casablanca — is part of the film lore that 
true fans make it their business to know.  Thus as distinct from but associated with 
their originals, epiquotations serve as metonyms without threat of distortion, 
without necessarily imperiling our epistemic duties.  Where epistemic duty is done, 
we cannot reject epiquotations on epistemic grounds.   
Epiquotation 
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 Although the proposed neologism “epiquotation” has some justification, 
more than terminological revision seems warranted.  To further disambiguate 
epiquotations, I propose a new punctuation mark.  This mark will not be as widely 
useful as quotation marks of course though it may serve as a convenience on par 
with shorthand, copyediting marks, or logical symbols as I will illustrate below.  
Many fonts have quotation marks that look something like this: 
 
 
 
Rotating the quotation marks ninety degrees yields an equals sign: 
 
    
 
 
In mathematics, the equals sign is straightforwardly distinct from the 
approximately equals sign:   
 
      
 
Rotating the approximately equals sign ninety degrees parallels the initial move 
from quotation marks to equals sign: 
 
     
 
 
Call the result epiquotation marks.  Such marks are fitting because they connote that 
enclosed expressions are not exactly but approximately the same as the originals.  
They also recall the potentially illusory effect of heat waves.  Hence, to quote from 
Casablanca, Play it  — but to epiquote,  Play it again, Sam.   
 Whether or not these proposals are adopted, it seems appropriate to 
conclude with the following paradoxical slant.  Epiquotations are extrinsic to the 
works that inspire them as they are not — unlike quotations — contained by those 
vs.  
Jason Holt 
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works.  Nonetheless, as memes they take on a life of their own and seem to become 
after the fact essential addenda, in a sense perhaps becoming modest artworks in 
their own right.  Note how Play it again, Sam  has become such an important 
frame for Casablanca, enhancing and encapsulating its aesthetic appeal, that it is 
now all but indispensable to our concept of the film.  The frame has become part of 
the work.  Although Casablanca was complete, was replete, before epiquotation, it 
has become more than it was.  It has achieved self-transcendence.  Despite its 
erstwhile completeness then, we may rightly if oddly view the unepiquoted 
predecessor as retroactively incomplete, lacking the meme that was to become its 
unforeseen descendant.  In contrast to the ossified eulogy that mere quotation 
often seems, epiquotation reflects an ongoing, living engagement with organic, 
vital works.15   
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ABSTRACT 
Of the three forms of reflective judgment analyzed in Kant’s third Critique, the pleasant has 
received the least attention because it is seen in part as purely subjective, in part as a mere foil for 
his theory of judgments of beauty.  This paper makes a case for the philosophical consideration of 
this kind of judgment by focusing on its converse:  the unpleasant is a form of aesthetic response 
that is initially negative but has great motivating power.  More modest and common than 
judgments of the purely beautiful or ugly and more rational than our visceral responses to the 
disgusting, the unpleasant can capture the aesthetic tenor of our daily lives and concerns. 
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Kant 
Aesthetic judgment 
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When I bought my current home, I announced that I simply could not live in it until 
the rooms had been painted.  They were what one might euphemistically describe 
as somewhere between apricot and salmon, but to my mind they were really what 
in my childhood was called “fleshtone” by Crayola Crayons.  Further, the walls had a 
slight sheen to them, making them sweaty fleshtone Crayola Crayon or maybe 
feverish fleshtone Crayola Crayon.  Never mind the structural work required on an 
old wooden house exposed to Canadian prairie winters — like a new roof perhaps 
— it was the paint that had to go.  Immediately. 
Now, it should be clear that I found the walls ghastly, even dreadful.  And I 
hope it is equally apparent that my response to them was aesthetic — albeit 
negatively so.  But what is particularly interesting is that my aesthetic judgment 
was also a spur to action.  I did not simply dislike or reject the walls (I did buy the 
house, after all); instead I strove to change them.  And this kind of response — that 
is negative but creatively motivating — holds some aesthetic promise.  As a reader 
of Kant, my impulse has been to call this a judgment of the unpleasant:  I would 
like to suggest that it is an aesthetic category worthy of consideration.  Of course 
there is a body of literature — extending back as far as Aristotle’s writing on 
catharsis — that deals with negative emotions in our aesthetic responses.  But such 
reactions, as they are described, do not for the most part involve a direct call to 
creative or transformative action.  What I seek to capture here is this peculiarly 
motivational force of negative emotions — as we will see. 
 When philosophy talks about aesthetic experience, it is most often in terms 
of our responses to art and other kinds of beauty and is largely concerned with 
pleasurable and positive responses as in Kant’s analysis of judgments of the 
beautiful.   But I think that the aesthetic tenor of our lives is in fact more complex — 
and as such more philosophically engaging.  One of the goals of the recent 
movement in Everyday Aesthetics has been the inclusion of action — not simply 
observation and reaction — in the scope of aesthetic experience.  Yuriko Saito, for 
instance, considers aesthetic responses that “do not presuppose or lead to such 
spectator-like experiences but rather prompt us towards actions” such as cleaning, 
purchasing, and repairing things like dilapidated buildings, rusty cars, and dirty 
linens.1  My effort to articulate the centrality of the aesthetic in our quotidian 
activities also drives my own interest in those moments when its force is at least 
initially negative.  In my case, those fleshtoned walls presented an obstacle to my 
aesthetic enjoyment of daily life.  And in seeking to change the walls, I had to 
Jane Forsey 
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creatively reimagine the space in which I would dwell with all of its possibilities 
and decide what was needed instead of that color so that the space could provide 
me with positive rather than negative experiences.  In short, I had to be 
aesthetically creative and active rather than merely responsive.  As a philosophical 
concept, the unpleasant can capture this.  But let me first distinguish it from two 
other negative aesthetic ideas. 
 The unpleasant is not the ugly.  A sick person can look ghastly without also 
looking ugly.2  A certain shirt can look dreadful on you without thereby being an 
ugly shirt.  And apricot, while perhaps awful on a living-room wall, is not itself an 
ugly color (at least when found on an apricot).  We tend to use terms like “dreadful” 
and “ghastly” as though they were synonymous with ugliness, but there is an 
important conceptual difference between them.  The purely ugly — or what is 
judged to be ugly tout court if one takes a Kantian approach to the matter — will 
have certain characteristics that the unpleasant does not have:  the judgment of 
ugliness will be disinterested, subjectively universal, and involve the free play of 
the cognitive faculties.  That is, judgments of the ugly will have the same logical 
structure as judgments of free beauty, acting as a negative mirror of them.  And like 
Kantian beauty, ugliness will invite us to linger.  The ugly does not provoke desire or 
aversion — again, judgments of the ugly are disinterested — but ugliness can 
fascinate us.3  Judgments of the ugly (and warty toads get a lot of press here) are 
made by us as mere spectators, and like judgments of the beautiful, judgments of 
the ugly involve no direct call to action.  Saying “this toad is ugly” or “this Francis 
Bacon is ugly” does not imply any revulsion or desire to turn away from what we are 
viewing — it can indeed draw us in.4 
 The unpleasant is also not the disgusting.  The disgusting, Kant writes, 
destroys all “aesthetical satisfaction”; when we encounter the disgusting, we “strive 
against it with all our might.”5  Disgust is visceral; it does not just repel us but 
physically revolts us as with rotten food or a decaying corpse.6  We reject the object 
before aesthetic judgment can even occur. 7 What disgusts us is immediate and 
quite personal, but it need not be ugly:  snakes, entrails, and placentas display what 
many would find to be beautiful colors or shapes in other contexts.  But if and 
when we are disgusted by these things, our capacity for disinterested reflection is 
destroyed through their forceful imposition on our (visual, olfactory) senses:  we 
often react with nausea.  Faced with the disgusting, we are either simply repelled or 
at best attempt to eradicate the offending object as when one finds maggots in the 
garbage or cockroaches on the stove.  But the disgusting is not an aesthetic 
response, and from it we are never inspired. 
 The unpleasant stands between the ugly and the disgusting — neither 
inviting us to linger nor driving us away — as an aesthetic response that is uniquely 
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motivating.  It bears a similar structure to Kant’s account of the pleasant.  The 
unpleasant is a feeling of displeasure — as the pleasant a feeling of pleasure — 
that is grounded in direct physical sensations rather than in the complex workings 
(or free play) of our cognitive faculties at some degree of distance.  Even so, the 
story of the unpleasant is not a strictly causal one as it also involves an aesthetic 
judgment.  We have a sensation and feel displeasure from it.  Experiences of the 
ugly also bring about feelings of displeasure.  The difference between the ugly and 
the unpleasant lies in the “relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure 
and pain” and not in the feelings themselves.8  That is, the displeasure which arises 
from the unpleasant stems from a judgment that is interested and provokes desire 
whereas the displeasure of the ugly is disinterested and desire-free.   
Kant’s examples of the pleasant are primarily gustatory, which may be why 
judgments of the pleasant have been seen as wholly subjective.  But he also states 
that this kind of aesthetic judgment regards not only “the taste of the tongue, the 
palate and the throat, but … whatever is pleasant to anyone’s eyes and ears” — that 
is, to the full range of our sensations, including those that have long been 
considered the sole domain of beauty.9  Still, a gustatory example may help us on 
our way.  Black licorice, I must confess, has an extremely unpleasant taste:  it gives 
me immediate displeasure (yuck!), and my judgment about it is negative.  This 
judgment leads to desire:  I judge licorice to be unpleasant, and when I represent it 
as being what has displeased me, my desire is provoked; in this case a desire to 
avoid not just licorice but all similar things:  ouzo, Sambuca, fennel, aniseed, and so 
on.  This is not a purely automatic response; it involves both a judgment and a 
mental representation.  In other words, my response is not visceral but rational and 
results in willed actions (evasive in this case) that are “directed and described by 
concepts”:  my knowing what things have that yuck-factor directs my deciding to 
avoid them and their relatives.10  Thus the unpleasant begins with physical 
sensations but engages our higher faculties:  judgment, conceptual thought, and 
the generation of rationally willed desires.  With the disgusting we do none of 
these things but are merely repelled; and with the ugly we are disinterested and 
our judgments produce no desires at all — which is why we can linger over that 
hideous toad. 
Judgments of the unpleasant are indeed subjective rather than universal.  
As we learn from Kant’s famous canary wine example, when I say licorice is 
unpleasant, I really ought to say it is unpleasant to me as I relate the sensation to my 
own feeling of displeasure.  This “taste of sense,” as Kant calls it, “lays down mere 
private judgments” which are empirical.11  However, what is often overlooked is 
that, like many other empirical rules, these judgments can make claims to general 
validity.  Kant notes that “actually there is often found a very extended concurrence 
in these judgments” as we can see from cultural preferences in gustatory tastes — 
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pigs’ feet for some, goats’ heads for others — and with historically changing trends 
in fashion and decorating:  from bell bottoms to skinny jeans, shag carpeting to 
hardwood floors.12  The unpleasant is more modest than the universalizing 
demands of ugliness and beauty but need not be completely personal:  it can speak 
to at least relative, general trends.   
The preceding gives us a basic account of the unpleasant.  My desire to 
avoid licorice is a desire for less just as a judgment of the pleasant (as of chocolate) 
provokes a desire for more.  But there is little creativity or inspiration associated 
with food aversions except of a very simple kind:  if there were nothing to eat but 
licorice, I might be prompted to creatively mask its flavor as when children use 
ketchup to cover the foods they don’t like.  Yet this is hardly the positive aesthetic 
engagement I first proposed.  A basic account of the unpleasant involves a largely 
negative outcome of a negative judgment:  what I am after is a positive outcome, 
one that provides a more interesting aesthetic response.  For this, let me return to 
the more complex example of the walls of my house.  They brought about 
immediate displeasure but having bought the house, I could not merely avoid 
them.  To live in the house was to encounter those walls on a daily basis.  Nor could 
I eradicate them:  a house needs walls after all.  And to get rid of the fleshtone was 
not to get rid of color altogether:  whatever I did, I would still have walls, and they 
would still have visual impact in my house.   
The question that emerged was what I wanted instead of fleshtone, and 
here the creative space opens up.  This “instead of” is open-ended and rife with 
possibility.  To attend to my desire to be free of fleshtone, I had to consider what 
would please me, what I could replace it with.  And this could be a great range of 
things:  a different color of paint, rolled, sponged, or splashed on the walls; 
wallpaper; hung fabrics; wood paneling — even shag carpet, I suppose.  But 
whatever it would be, I would have to engage imaginatively with the problem that 
the unpleasant posed to me and produce a positive solution to it. 
How creative and engaged I was in response to the walls is also open-
ended:  I could have undertaken a study of color theory, taken courses in interior 
design, experimented, or simply hired a decorator.  But even in the last instance, I 
would still have had to choose from suggestions posed to me.  If I did not — if I 
simply said “do something” — I would have been no more engaged than I am with 
the avoidance of licorice.  The unpleasant provides an opportunity for aesthetic 
action:  it is not one that we are compelled to accept.  But when we do accept it, 
when our initial negative judgments give rise to an imagining of what the “instead 
of” could be, we are, I think, more aesthetically engaged in our lives than we are 
when we simply survey the beauty or ugliness that we see around us.  The 
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unpleasant brings with it — in fact, initiates — creative action, and the unpleasant 
is perhaps the only form of aesthetic judgment to do so.   
As a catalyst of aesthetic action, the unpleasant provides a particular 
problem that focuses our attention.  In so doing, it gives rise to complex and 
nuanced aesthetic decisions.  With the walls, just as mere avoidance was 
insufficient, so too was simply choosing another color that I liked better than 
fleshtone:  some colors which I like — black for example — would not have 
improved the walls of the house at all.  How to fix the fleshtone problem involved  
considerations of the style of the house, the size and shape of the rooms, the 
amount and direction of the light, the color of the hardwood, and so on.  These 
forms of engagement are open-ended yet at the same time quite specific to the 
problem at hand.  They involve choices, desires, and actions.  They are constrained 
by the negativity of the original judgment but also by the physical, logical, 
economic, and even conceptual limitations of the problem.  But they are free and 
open-ended in that within these parameters, our activities are guided by our 
imagination and creativity.  Either that or we hire decorators. 
In our daily lives and activities, experiences that summon what Kant calls 
“pure” judgments of beauty are just not that common (unless we are very 
fortunate).  We are more often mucking about with what pleases and displeases us, 
what to preserve or have more of, and what to avoid, eradicate, or transform.  We 
are concerned with and affected by questions of how and where to live, of gardens 
and homes and offices, cars, kitchens, and fashions — of making these spaces and 
things those that give rise to experiences of comfort and pleasure.  This mucking 
about, I think, constitutes the larger part of our lives and activities and has an 
important aesthetic element.  To make something better, good enough, or just 
right, as Saito has noted, begins with a judgment that it is somehow lacking and 
needs our attention and care.   
If I have made the beginnings of a case for the unpleasant as an aesthetic 
category, does it not still remain private and purely personal?  After all, the previous 
owners of my house clearly chose and favored fleshtone for their décor.  Was all of 
my creative activity directed only at pleasing myself?  If so, how much philosophical 
interest can the unpleasant have?  I’d like to end with a suggestion that the 
unpleasant has a broader reach than the wholly subjective, that it can extend to 
others even if it cannot achieve the kind of universality that Kant hoped for with 
pure judgments of taste.  Both Saito’s and Kant’s examples are in fact unhelpful for 
a more robust account of the unpleasant:  hers, because judgments about 
dilapidation, dirt, and so on are what she calls “moral-aesthetic” judgments, which 
have an objective aspect that involves all of us; his because his examples of 
gustatory taste involve each of us alone.13  
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 Let me return to the gustatory for a moment:  instead of focusing on 
choosing or avoiding foods because of my own palate, where there is indeed no 
arguing about taste, let us imagine that I am cooking for others who have been 
invited to dine.  Of course I want them to have a pleasant experience — I want to 
arouse their desire to return; therefore I want to please their palates too.  That is, 
my creative activity in the kitchen concerns a community of others — even if it is 
not a universal one.  Kant did note that the unpleasant and the pleasant can make 
claim to general validity and not mere personal satisfaction.  There are historically 
and culturally specific gustatory norms that we follow when entertaining:  the time 
at which we have dinner, the courses served and in what order, the utensils used, 
and so on.  These norms are decidedly not universal, but neither are they merely 
personal idiosyncratic choices.  Having “taste” here refers not merely to our own but 
to a taste and pleasure that is, however locally, shared. 
Similarly, my own actions in countering the unpleasant can be seen in a 
wider context.  Painting the walls of my house was not an act intended merely to 
bring me private pleasure but also to make my home a welcoming place for friends 
and family, a space of hospitality and enjoyment.  It is not that I expect guests to 
share my taste in color or that I “impute” or “ascribe” the same judgments to others 
— as Kant claims that we do in judgments of beauty.14  But my striving, I wish to 
suggest, was also not wholly self-regarding, and the aesthetic force of the 
unpleasant lies in part in the way that it involves us in a community of others, 
however small or local that community may be.  What we are aiming for in making 
something better or good enough or just right for ourselves is the hopeful 
possibility that that something will be better or good enough for others too.  Even 
such a modest notion of the unpleasant can have this effect:  it points to the power 
of the aesthetic in our lives.  
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Notes 
	
 
1 Yuriko Saito, Everyday Aesthetics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 10, 51. 
2 G. P. Henderson, “The Concept of Ugliness,” British Journal of Aesthetics 6 (1966): 219–229; 222.  
Henderson uses the term “ugliness” throughout his paper but distinguishes between kinds of 
ugliness in a way that is similar to Kant’s distinction between the ugly, the unpleasant, and the 
disgusting. 
3 Christian Wenzel, “Kant Finds Nothing Ugly?” British Journal of Aesthetics 39, no. 4 (1999): 416–422; 418. 
An anonymous reviewer of this article described this fascination as “it’s horrid, but I can’t stop 
watching,” which well captures what I seek to describe here. 
4 There has been a great deal of debate in recent years about whether ugliness can be made consistent 
with Kantian aesthetic theory.  I will bypass this debate and note only that if there is such a thing as 
pure ugliness, it will have the features that I have described. 
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard, New York: Hafner, 1951, §48, Ak 312. 
6 Henderson, 220. 
7 Mojca Kuplen, “Disgust and Ugliness: A Kantian Perspective,” Contemporary Aesthetics 9 (2011): 1–21; 
12. 
8 Kant, §5, Ak 209. 
9 Ibid., §5, Ak 212. 
10 Rachel Zuckert, “A New Look at Kant’s Theory of Pleasure,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60, 
no. 3 (2002): 239–252; 246. 
11 Kant, §7, Ak. 212. 
12 Ibid., §7, Ak. 213. 
13 Saito, 208. 
14 Kant, §8, Ak 216. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Jane Forsey 
24  Evental Aesthetics    
	
	
	
References 
 
Henderson, G. P.  “The Concept of Ugliness.”  British Journal of Aesthetics 6 (1966). 
219–229. 
Kant, Immanuel.  Critique of Judgment. Trans. J.H. Bernard. New York: Hafner, 1951. 
Kuplen, Mojca.  “Disgust and Ugliness:  A Kantian Perspective.”  Contemporary 
Aesthetics 9 (2011). 1–21. 
Saito, Yuriko.  Everyday Aesthetics.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Wenzel, Christian. “Kant Finds Nothing Ugly?” British Journal of Aesthetics 39, no. 4 
(1999). 416–422. 
Zuckert, Rachel.  “A New Look at Kant’s Theory of Pleasure.”  Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 60, no. 3 (2002). 239–252. 
 
 25  Evental Aesthetics    
 
 
The Extended Body 
and the Aesthetics 
of Merleau-Ponty 
David Goldblatt 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  Volume 5 Number 1 (2016)   26  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
An extended “restless” body was the center of perceptual and ontological importance for Merleau-
Ponty —  a source of insight into how persons navigate and understand the world.  But he was 
sufficiently aware as well of the roles an extended body played in art.  This paper considers two 
stages in Merleau-Ponty’s work, roughly corresponding to his early and late writings, where the 
boundary between body and world can be flexible and complex but where the body’s extension is 
artistically significant.  After Fred Rush’s coinage of “prosthetic effect,” I utilize prosthesis 
metaphorically to illustrate the use of an extended body in the production and reception of art 
when the world demands an immediate response and the imposition of engagement and where 
the potential for aesthetic identification has greater explanatory power as a unit than as a body 
separate from that environment.  The second use deals with Merleau-Ponty’s more difficult 
notions of flesh and chiasm to consider an intersecting world unfolding itself —  reversing the 
direction of the usual dialogue between artist and a soliciting world, as Merleau-Ponty sees it.  In 
the course of doing so, this essay includes a discussion of Paul Klee’s painting, The Ventriloquist in 
the Moors, Descartes on phantom limb pains and artistic identity.  While technology has fostered 
digital devices, which appear as prostheses and form significant aspects of our culture, Merleau-
Ponty had imagined our extended bodies in more ubiquitous and quotidian ways. 
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The Extended Body and the Aesthetics of Merleau-Ponty 
 
Maurice  Merleau-Ponty was sufficiently astute in recognizing that an 
extended view of the human body had significant consequences for the 
understanding of production, reception, and experience in art.  In this paper I 
use the metaphor of a prosthesis to illuminate aspects of an extended 
human body, which in certain contexts is at one with the person extended, 
and hope to show that what others have called a prosthetic effect has 
explanatory power when it comes to artists and the auditors of their work.  
The use of a prosthetic metaphor is primarily about identification and in this 
paper artistic identification, where thinking of a unit is more useful (and a 
stronger claim) than thinking about elements that are separate and 
individual.  
This paper is organized into four sections.  The first indicates the use 
of the prosthetic metaphor from a phenomenological point of view and 
notes how Merleau-Ponty understands the extended body, not simply as a 
way of navigating the world but also how it functions in an aesthetic domain.  
The second section turns to Paul Klee’s painting, The Ventriloquist in the Moors, 
where I see the ventriloquist tied to his dummy as an apt example of a 
prosthetic effect and the moors an excellent case of the world folding back 
upon the body.  The third section introduces a Cartesian point of view, to 
which Merleau-Ponty was opposed, utilizing the ventriloqual analogy to 
help dismiss Descartes’ views of animals as automata and persons as 
ontologically dual.  And lastly, I move the prosthetic discussion to the artistic 
identity of the artist as I suggest Merleau-Ponty understands it. 
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The Prosthetic and Merleau-Ponty 
 
In my use of the term ‘prosthesis’ I hope to distinguish two kinds that are 
relevant to Merleau-Ponty’s various views on art and the artist.  There is, for 
Merleau-Ponty, a practical perceptual immediacy for which the prosthetic 
metaphor is important.  However, there is also the more general, universal 
ontology where the concepts of flesh and chiasm, as utilized for example in 
the posthumous work The Visible and the Invisible, stretch the body’s intimacy 
with the world forming an intimate binary —  a situated body and a 
complex, intersecting world that folds back upon it. 
When the body is up against situations where responsibility, 
potentiality, and action appear to be demanded, the aforementioned 
prosthetic metaphor expresses the body’s extended domain.  But here the 
claim is stronger than, say, the affordances given in an environment, but 
rather the prosthetic is a point of view where what we might otherwise think 
of as independent entities is thought of as one.  That idea brings to the fore 
the incarnation, the melding and contact, of the animate and the inanimate.  
But with respect to his general ontology, which Merleau-Ponty has called an 
astronomical sense of the world, is his notion of a chiasm, an intertwining, 
interconnected universe —  akin to Leibniz’s pre-established harmony.  It is a 
perspective of a world internality related.   
Well into the background of Merleau-Ponty‘s philosophy is the belief 
that the sciences, for all their astounding prosperity and achievement, are 
about dead things, or rather the reductionist physicalism of science excludes 
as basic ontology the recognition of the lively activity of objects of 
perception.  Even in the cosmological analysis of pre-Socratic Greece, with 
the ancient elements, earth, air, fire, and water, a chance was missed for 
something live being elemental.  In contrast, Merleau-Ponty uses the general 
term ‘flesh’ as something he refers to as elemental.  Suppose we leave that as 
background and return to it later on, less as a full ontological account but 
rather as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics. 
Writing about the phenomenology of architecture, Fred Rush 
explains Merleau-Ponty’s idea of a body already embedded in the world, an 
extended living body not separated from a world perceived, in terms of a 
prosthesis.  In introducing his analysis of Steven Holl’s 2004 modernist Bloch 
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Addition to the Nelson-Atkins Museum in Kansas City, itself an extension, he 
says, “Merleau-Ponty stresses that objects and spaces appear to me almost as 
bodily —  i.e., as continuous of my own bodily movements and aims.” 1
When we think about prosthetics in this general sense of an 
extended body, additional examples from everyday life are not hard to find: 
the third baseman’s mitt on his hand but also the space considered the 
defensive domain of that position, the fork in the hand of the diner but also 
the plate on the table are examples (the ‘I can’ of the fielder or diner), which 
after a time being unthinking or natural extensions of ourselves for purposes 
of expanding our status and/or powers, without which the doing of what we 
intend would not be a possible circumstance or at best would not be possible 
to do well.  Prosthetic effects are oriented toward a future and are expressed 
under conditions of intention and responsibility.  Here of course I am 
widening the application (but not the general meaning of prosthesis) to 
stretch well beyond its work in the anatomical reconstruction of missing 
limbs.  This general sense of prosthesis implies an integration of a body with 
something otherwise thought to be external to it.  In this more general sense, 
there are links between self and world where the world’s objects are 
  He 
says, “There are times when the prosthetic effect is extremely strong —  e.g., 
a musician’s experience of her favorite instrument as indissolubly part of 
her.” 2  For Merleau-Ponty, an experience like playing the violin or typing is a 
pre-conscious activity closely linked with habit, sometimes a haptic 
experience as when touching comes together with other senses, all or some 
merging.  At times, as Rush says, the effect may be strong but may vary in 
degrees of embodiness and unity.  Here, Rush is emphasizing that perceiving 
the world may be a matter of the predominance of one bodily aspect over 
another, arms rather than legs as with the violin, or may involve the body as a 
whole, which surely is not always the case.  So then, the prosthetic effect 
need not be an experience of tactile physical contact, but rather the 
perceptual field need only be an extension of my body as far as the 
“projection of my aims regarding that space and objects.” 3  So, according to 
Rush, the prosthetic extension of our bodies includes what may lie ahead of 
us as part of our perceptual moment —  the objects in the space at which I 
aim to traverse but have not yet arrived, as with the Bloch Addition leading 
the visitor architecturally.  Later on I will make reference to the artist’s 
identity, which is less physical, more ethereal, but with inescapable 
consequences stemming from a prosthetic or prosthetic-like effect but 
susceptible to change as we shall see.  
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unthinkingly perceived as part of our selves, and the distinction between 
acting with them and being without them, that is, as external objects or 
parts of our bodies —  this ambiguity —  is simply irrelevant.  Those times, 
those conditions, I am thinking of as prosthetic occurrences, their effects and 
experiences. 
Consider these remarks by Merleau-Ponty:   
 
A woman may, without any calculation, keep a safe distance between the 
feather in her hat and things which may break it off.  She feels where the feather 
is, just as we feel where our hand is.  If I am in the habit of driving a car, I enter a 
narrow opening and see that I can ‘get through’ without comparing the width of 
the opening with that of the wings, just as I go through a doorway without 
checking the width of the doorway against my body. … The blind man’s stick has 
ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has 
become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch, 
providing a parallel to sight.  In the exploration of things, the length of the stick 
does not enter expressly as a middle term: the blind man is rather aware of it 
through the position of objects rather than the position of objects through it.4   
 
One consequence of the bodily prosthetic is that the boundaries of selves can 
change.  The woman with the hat would not always be wearing it, and the 
man in the car need not be condemned to a life of driving.  The point here is 
that identities of selves, how and where they move, their domain of 
responsibility and power, their limits and opportunities may be strong but 
temporary, even fleeting, may change on a dime and in many cases with 
corresponding changes in an identity of the person involved.  In the case of 
the driver or the third baseman, traces or vestiges of those identities may 
subsist when no longer in their former prosthetic circumstance, like driving 
or playing baseball, so that we may recognize and identify each as driver or 
baseball player when not driving or playing ball.  The trace of celebrity is 
particularly obvious, being most apparent with in-person appearances of 
movie and television stars, their work carried with them to other contexts.  
However, a prosthetic vestige can be the subject of social controversy as with 
the players of video games when they are away from their gorgeous display 
screens and dramatic fictional narratives. 
The idea that a prosthetic effect can have serious moral 
consequences has a great deal to do with these traces and has come to the 
fore in issues regarding video games.  If I play at killing men or abusing 
women, where the mechanisms of virtual reality are prostheses in my 
control, very much like musical instruments, will my attitudes or behavior 
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continue in subtle ways when the game is over?  I am after all empowered in 
situations that I have entered and effected in ways that are unlike movies or 
novels, where my involvement logically prevents me from entering the 
action.  Such games, enhanced by a new realism perfected by technology, are 
particularly poignant cases of taking art personally.  Or, we might note that 
the cultural consequences of our attachments to mobile devices have not yet 
been sorted out. 
Garry Hagberg has suggested that when it comes to the mind/body 
problem, we should use the term ‘body’ only with respect to corpses.5  
However, when Merleau-Ponty uses the term “body image,” what he implies 
by ‘body’ is a certain dynamic.  By “dynamic” he says,  “this term means that 
my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or 
possible task.”  And by spatiality he means a spatiality of situation to contrast 
it with simply a position in space like the fielding situation of the third 
baseman or the musical session of the violinist.  Our body always takes 
location with it, and location is oriented in a site-specific context.  As Deleuze 
and Guattari quip, “never is the pasture separated from the cows that 
populate it.” 6  However, the idea of context here includes possibilities and 
change and with it a future which may be unpredicted and intermingled 
with an unlimited array of forthcoming events and objects. The location of 
the body for Merleau-Ponty is a place of “unrest,” and the interaction 
between the perceiver and the perceived takes the form of interrogation or 
questioning, a dialogue that is a general condition of philosophy itself, with 
the world responding. 
Commonplace in the creative process as well as in the experience of 
the spectator is a prosthetic element when photographer and camera are at 
work or painter with oils and brush.  The dancing surface is prosthetic; the 
performance floor and performance space are considered extensions of the 
dancers.  The dancing surface may be stepped or sloped as well as flat, ice or 
like ice or puddled water as in the case of Gene Kelly in the rain, or a surface 
broken in a swimming pool in a Busby Berkeley performance.  Or, the 
microphone’s impact on singers and songs and then its miniaturization for 
singing and dancing transformed entertainment.  In each case, an 
appreciation of the artistic event would be incomplete without taking into 
account the prosthetic effect and its at-oneness with the artist and 
performer.  No doubt, we often do this without the need to articulate its 
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status, and it is always possible to see the prosthesis as an independent 
element. 
 
Paul Klee and Ventriloquism 
As art expresses or exposes the meaning of a culture, it extends it in new and 
imaginative ways.  So, it is not surprising that throughout the work of 
Merleau-Ponty the arts play a central role.  After Cézanne, Matisse, and 
Leonardo, Paul Klee is the painter he discusses most frequently.  Galen 
Johnson reminds us that Klee’s “The Thinking Mind” was influential in 
Merleau-Ponty’s own “Eye/Mind” and that “it was in the reflections of Paul 
Klee on the art of painting that Merleau-Ponty found some of the most 
germinating insights” for that writing.7  He attributes to Klee’s work an 
emphasis on the line, which he says is “an adventure, a history, a meaning of 
the line” and “a blueprint of a genesis of things” as it “renders the visible.”   
Klee’s paintings, The Vocal Fabric of Singer Rosa Silber and Battle Scene from the 
Comic Operatic Fantasy “The Seafarer,” deal with popular vocal performance, 
hence examining vocality through the visible as with his 1923 painting The 
Ventriloquist in the Moors. 
Paul Klee’s The Ventriloquist in the Moors can be read as an exemplar of 
many aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.  Klee worked on this painting 
while at the Bauhaus, where he had built his son Felix a puppet theatre for 
Punch and Judy shows and over the years had produced more than 500 
works whose titles related to theatre, masks, music, and puppets.  There is an 
obvious connection in Klee’s painting with der Bauchredner, the German word 
for ventriloquist, literally belly or stomach speaker, and what appears as the 
ventriloquist’s motionless lips, his mouth tied at the top of his face.  The 
ventriloquist’s transparent belly contains a host of imaginary creatures, 
perhaps the ventriloquist’s vocal interpretations of the natural citizenry of 
the moors, a kind of primordial or wild nature, while he seems to be 
captivating yet another at the bottom of the painting.  Merleau-Ponty  notes 
Cézanne saying, “The landscape thinks itself in me and I am its 
consciousness.” 8  That the body of the ventriloquist exhibits transparency 
reflects a certain uniqueness of the act: that ventriloquism is illusion without 
deception.  Further, in a more general way, ambiguity, a central concept in 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of being —  presence and absence, incarnation and 
transcendence for example are paralleled in the ventriloquist’s effacement 
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of herself as speaker while presenting herself as an alternate persona.  And, 
we have in this painting something Merleau-Ponty believes the artist does 
generally:  “ … he is spelling out nature at the moment he is recreating it.” 9 
In the usual case, the strange speech act of the ventriloquist is a 
paradigm case of the prosthetic.  The dummy is attached to the ventriloquist 
as an extension of her body and her potential abilities —  what she does with 
her hands in manipulating her dummy as she pretends to listen while 
speaking is as much a part of her attempt at illusion as keeping her lips still.  
The ventriloquist and the dummy, like the subject-object, form a binary 
relationship —  there is no one without the other.  However, in Klee’s 
ventriloqual painting, it would seem that there is no apparent external 
object to play the role of the usual mechanism for the object of the 
ventriloquist’s “thrown voice.”  While this may warrant no explanation, it is 
sufficiently curious to deserve some comment and one that is particularly 
relevant to Merleau-Ponty’s work, having to do with one of his more 
significant remarks.  He says, 
 
 The painter lives in fascination.  The actions most proper to him … seem to 
emanate from the things themselves … Inevitably, the roles between him and 
the visible are reversed … That is why so many painters have said that things look 
at them.  As André Marchand says, after Klee, ‘In a forest, I have felt many times 
over that it was not I who looked at the forest.  Some days I felt that the trees 
were looking at me … I was there listening.  I think that the painter must be 
penetrated by the universe and not want to penetrate it.’ 10   
 
Merleau-Ponty says, “Things pass into us as we into things.” 11  In this painting 
by Klee, it is the forest, the inhabitants of the moors as approximately 
imitated or interpreted by the ventriloquist that have penetrated the 
ventriloquist’s body as the body had first to penetrate it.  The penetration of 
the visible world is what the perceiver sees while at the same time what is 
invisible is meaning; what the perceiver imposes upon the world that speaks 
to him.  The world is not passive but folds back upon the perceiver.  In short, it 
is nature itself, displayed as moors, that replaces the traditional dummy in 
Klee’s painting, but it is the ventriloquist speaking for an otherwise silent 
world.  Galen Johnson asks, “Why is it that painters have so often said, in the 
manner of Klee, that the forest is speaking in them, or the trees were looking 
at them, or why did Cézanne say that ‘nature is on the inside?’  It must be that 
there is a system of exchange between body and world such that eye and 
hand become the obverse side of things, the inside of an outside in which are 
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both enveloped.” 12  On this account, Klee’s painting illustrates the 
interactivity between the body and the animated moors.  And this, according 
to Johnson, is the opposite of what we might expect.13 
In many cases of prosthesis or prosthesis-like effects, its removal 
would result in a significant step backwards, a change in the status and 
powers of the perceiving body so that without the cane the blind man is a 
man less mobile.  This may be an awkward way of emphasizing that as the 
violin expands the powers of the player, the identity of the body playing is 
also altered so that the prosthesis is a factor in identification of the violin 
player as well.  As in the case of the ventriloquist and her dummy, one 
identifies the other.  It is a marriage of sorts between this couple, self and 
world, that would be misleading at best to think of each as independent — 
misleading not to accept a wider, if temporary, perceptual view of the self in 
action.  With the prosthetic as with the ventriloquist act, it is possible to see 
the inanimate and animate merely as separate objects, but in both cases the 
point of it all would be missed entirely. 
 
Flesh and Chiasm – an aesthetic connection 
 
A great deal of literature has been devoted to Merleau-Ponty’s dual notions 
of chiasm and flesh.  Not the least reason for this volume is the difficulty in 
interpreting just what Merleau-Ponty was up to regarding his choice of those 
particular, imaginative terms.  My interest in this section of the paper is to 
link these concepts with Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetically relevant concerns 
rather than offer an extensive ontological account. 
In his book Action and Agency in Dialogue, François Cooren says, “The 
term embodiment or its Latin version, incarnation, etymologically refers to 
the act of being made flesh (carnis means flesh in Latin) or being given a 
body. … While the term incarnation is often used in a religious context … it is 
noteworthy that (Harold) Garfinkel did not hesitate to use this terminology 
to refer to the incarnated character of things” as diverse as rules, norms, 
mutual understandings, and even institutions to the extent that they are 
shown to be “‘incarnately displayed’ in interaction.” 14  The use of the word 
flesh appears in Sartre’s Being and Nothing in his chapter on the body, where 
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he uses it as recognition of the Other stripped of its particulars (race, 
ethnicity, etc.), mere corporeals but always in a situation.  He adds that such 
an affective apprehension of its contingency results in a particular kind of 
nausea.15  No doubt Merleau-Ponty would like to retain this visceral 
connotation as flesh passes between the world of the body to the body of the 
world of things.  The word ‘flesh’ helps to emphasis that which is soft, 
flexible, and supple as the flesh of the body takes on the forms of a world 
that is neither linear nor monolithic but rather gains its meaning as it folds 
itself towards our own bodily flesh.  This unfolding in the reversibility of 
perception implies a route that is not simple and direct but tends to take on 
meaning in a variety of directions.  The landscape, he says, is overrun with 
words.  Even when one perceives red in a certain context, the red belongs to a 
constellation of reds, the Revolution, “certain terrains near Aix or 
Madagascar,” red garments, not to mention a set of personal associations 
that may return to the seer with a swarm of emotions. 16 
Merleau-Ponty says, “That the presence of the world is precisely the 
presence of my flesh to its flesh, that ‘I am of the world’ and that I am not it, 
this is what is no sooner said than forgotten: metaphysics remains 
coincidence.” 17  This two-sided feature of flesh, belonging to our bodies and 
the world, is described this way by Jerry Gill:   
 
Flesh not only serves as the exterior line of demarcation for the individual 
subject, but it serves as well as the point or veil of the connection with the 
‘outside’ world.  In short, flesh faces in two directions at once and thereby unites 
us with as well as separates us from the world of things and persons in which we 
are situated.  Moreover, flesh breathes or seeps, as well as containing or 
separating. … In this sense, Merleau-Ponty sees the fleshly character of our 
embodiment as limiting or grafting us to one another as well as providing our 
individual entry point into the world. 18   
 
This dual nature is distinguished in art by a flesh that perceives and a flesh 
that cannot. 
In “Cézanne’s Doubt,” Merleau-Ponty sees the artist in the example of 
Cézanne, deviating from the practical but habitual world of “man-made 
objects” suspending a world of familiarity and comfort.  Here we can find an 
artist’s extension of the body as contrasted with the prosthetic effect of the 
woman and her hat, the man and his automobile.  It is a matter of dislocation 
as with the ventriloquist and acquaintance with an alternate vision.  He says,   
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We live in a world of man-made objects, among tools, in houses, streets, cities, 
and most of the time we see them only through human actions, which put them 
to use.  We become used to thinking that all this exists necessarily and 
unshakably.  Cézanne’s painting suspends these habits of thought and reveals 
the base of inhuman nature upon which man has installed himself.  This is why 
Cézanne’s people are strange, as if viewed by another species.  Nature itself is 
stripped of its attributes which make it ready for animistic communions: there is 
no wind in the landscape, no movement on the Lac d’Annecy; the frozen objects 
hesitate as at the beginning of the world. 19   
 
With Cézanne and so for the indefinite possibilities of art, Merleau-Ponty 
sees the prosthetic connection of a body with a world unveiled —  a primitive 
landscape, like the moors for Klee, intimately and animatedly portrayed.  It is 
an astounding possibility of picturing a nature that cannot any longer be 
perceived. 
This animistic communion is an understanding of the world as flesh.  
As Merleau-Ponty says of Cézanne’s painting, the landscape “is caught alive 
in a net which would let nothing escape.” 20  But for Merleau-Ponty, the world 
is reflecting and inviting us, attracting us at all perspectival turns, an 
inescapable occasion for meaning.  One might say that Cézanne has seeped 
into some of the many alternate aspects of the chiasm and visualized it, 
rendering it with meaning that had not to that point been the object of any 
seer —  previously invisible.  If we return to the idea that artists interrogate 
the world and engage it in dialogue, reversing the direction of the artist’s 
imposition upon the world, we might say that Cézanne has asked some 
unusual ontological questions about how some aspects of the chiasmatic 
world might appear to his body.  And, says Merleau-Ponty, “It is by lending his 
body to the world that the artist changes the world into paintings.” 21 
On this interpretation, the world is seductive —  the case of Odysseus 
tied to the mast is simply universal.  As Fred Evans says, “Objects solicit our 
bodies, that is, ourselves, and we complete their meaning within the setting 
where they appear to us: they beckon to us, we render them more definite, 
and each, from the very beginning, requires the other in order to be that 
invitation and that response.  So intertwined are we with what we encounter 
that Merleau-Ponty says, ‘the world is wholly inside {me} and I am wholly 
outside myself.’” 22  
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Artistic Identity 
 
In his article, “The Origins of Selves,” Daniel Dennett argues against what he 
calls a fixed and minimal self in favor of one where our personal boundaries, 
as with Merleau-Ponty, may in certain circumstances change by virtue of 
expanding.  He says, “[A] minimal self is not a thing inside a lobster or a lark, 
and it is not the ‘whole lobster’ or the ‘whole lark’ either; it is something 
abstract which amounts just to the existence of an organization which tends 
to distinguish, control, and preserve portions of the world, an organization 
that thereby creates and maintains boundaries.” 23 Dennett argues for a view 
of selves unbounded by bodies that is similar to Merleau-Ponty’s extended 
embodiment.  
The intimate  relationship between an artist and what she has 
achieved reflects the kind of extended boundaries of self that the name of 
the artist exemplifies and in this sense is like a prosthetic effect.  The artist’s 
personal body of work, the achievements of the past, their domain of 
chronological location, is part of the artist’s body of the present.  Merleau-
Ponty says, “There is no essence, no idea, that does not adhere to a domain of 
history and geography.” 24  What occurs in terms of artistic identity is a 
dynamic relationship between past and present.  
This familiar idea that the artist’s life and work are to be connected in 
an intimate or personal contextualism is echoed by Merleau-Ponty.  
Jonathan Gilmore notes that, “Merleau-Ponty will reject the dichotomy 
between self and its external attributes, actions and experiences. … For 
Merleau-Ponty, art, artist, and artist’s life are interdependent … Merleau-
Ponty will introduce a way of conceiving of art as reflecting its creator’s life, 
but not transparently. That is, Merleau-Ponty will argue that this internal 
relation reflects contingencies in how the work and life should unfold.” 25  
The word ‘chiasm’ like the term ‘prosthetic’ is borrowed from general 
medical research.  It designates a complex set of intersecting, intertwining 
relationships, some invisible like the institutions under which we operate 
and the events that form a history.  For example, the third baseman 
mentioned earlier as an example of a situated prosthetic effect is also 
intimately connected to the institution of baseball with its set of constitutive 
and regulative rules as well as to past statistics that are relevant to his post 
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and, if professional, the in-person and beamed lineup of fans throughout the 
world.  The diner is aligned with farms and commerce, with sets of recipes 
and their creators, and with the silversmiths and inventors of eating utensils 
and the textile industries for napkins and tablecloths.   
The insistence on contextualism broader than the artist’s work is 
many-faceted for Merleau-Ponty, but he is quick to understand it as a kind of 
anti-elitism; that art is only a part of but connected to any artist’s life who 
lives in a world like others. Here is one example from his numerous accounts:   
 
If we take the painter’s point of view in order to be present at that decisive 
moment when what has been given to him to live as corporeal destiny, personal 
adventures or historical events crystallizes into ‘the motive,’ we will recognize 
that his work, which is never an effect, is always a response to these data, and 
that the body, the life, the landscapes, the schools, the mistresses, the creditors, 
the police, and the revolutions which might suffocate painting are also the bread 
his work consecrates.  To live in painting is still to breathe the air of this world — 
above all for the man who sees something in the world of paint.  And there is a 
little of him in every man. 26   
 
Succinctly put, in “Cezanne’s Doubt” he says, “We never get away from our 
life.” 27 
 
Descartes, Ventriloquism, Speech, and Phantom Limbs 
 
In one of Merleau-Ponty’s many expressions of anti-Cartesianism, he says, “A 
Cartesian does not see himself when he looks in the mirror; he sees a 
dummy, an ‘outside,’ which, he has every reason to believe, other people see 
in the very same way.” 28  I hope to make use of the ideas of ventriloqual 
illusion and prosthetic effect as it relates to Descartes by recalling his work 
on phantom limb pains, which is an absence of flesh made relevant by virtue 
of illusion.  The illusion of ventriloquism is something like what happens at 
the movies where the sound system, aptly called speakers, is dislocated from 
the speakers (the mouths of the speakers) visually presented, the characters 
whose visual images are apart from their voice source on the screen but 
completing the seamless illusion.  In a remarkably similar sense, the 
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Cartesian body is the object of an illusion and, as I will argue, a prosthetic of 
the mind. 
To begin with, Descartes, who holds that the greatest prejudice we 
have retained from infancy is that of believing that brutes think, is notorious 
for his claim that animals are mere automata, material bodies without 
minds.  While they move about on their own and are more complex, animals 
are but nevertheless something like the dummies of the ventriloquist, a 
certain species of mechanical thing.  While Descartes is more generous 
towards the souls of animals in his Passions of the Soul —  more than in his 
Discourse on Method —  animals have no thoughts though they may exhibit 
pain behavior without feeling pain.  Descartes’ evidence for the inability of 
animals to think is that they have no capacity for speech.  Descartes’ claim 
regarding animals was true too for the bodies of humans so that 
ontologically animals and human bodies are comparable.  In a certain post-
Hobbesian spirit, Descartes, a great dissector of corpses, says,  “I might 
consider the body of a man as a kind of machine equipped with and made up 
of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin in such a way that, even if 
there were no mind in it, it would still perform all the same movements as it 
now does in those cases where movement is not under the control of the will 
or, consequently, of the mind.” 29  Here is where the idea of illusion rises to the 
occasion.  Since bodies cannot feel pain, the mind helpfully judges its 
location at the point of bodily damage where the pain is not since pain is 
only in the mind.  For Descartes then, I am merely under the illusion that the 
pain is in my foot when I step on a nail.   
Aware of what we call phantom limb pains, Descartes says, “I had 
heard that those who had a leg or an arm amputated sometimes still 
seemed to feel pain intermittently in the missing part of the body.” 30  
Cleverly, the illusion that the pain is in my foot when I step on a nail is 
something like a bizarre reversal of phantom limb pains.  In phantom limb 
phenomena, the pain might seem to be coming from a foot I do not have.  
For Descartes, in the more usual case, there is illusion in that pain seems to 
come from a foot I do have.  I am under an illusion in each case, but when the 
pain in my foot seems to come from my foot when the foot I have is injured 
but instead comes from the mind, it is hardly a coincidence.  It is, for 
Descartes, an illusion fostered by the goodness of God but congruent 
actually with good Darwinian reasons. 
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In a scenario that resembles the act of the ventriloquist, Descartes, 
writing in Meditation Six, says, “Nature also teaches me, by these sensations 
of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in my body as a 
sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, 
intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit.” 31  This well-known 
sailor analogy has its ventriloqual vocabulary:  being closely joined to, 
intermingled with, forming a unit are good enough to characterize the 
ventriloquist/dummy connection.  But since it is speech that interests me 
here, my point is that for Descartes, the human body itself takes on a role 
similar to the dummy with the mind akin to the vocal source of the 
ventriloquist.  While the location of speech, unlike the ventriloquist’s 
dummy, comes from the public body, its origin comes from the non-
corporeal, animate but private mind, made audible by the body.  It is an 
interior projecting its thoughts on an exterior —  or so the logic of dualism 
goes —  and I am tempted to parallel the ventriloquist’s act by calling this a 
dislocation of vocality.  However, since the mind has no location, is not 
capable of being extended or closely joined with anything at all, the parallel 
there falls short.  So goes this reductio. 
Here, Descartes’ view of animals and the privileging of his own mind 
to ward off the illusions presented by the body is only a special case of his 
initial general solipsism, a dismissing of the body as a source of knowledge 
and a determiner of the body’s navigation through its immediate 
environment.  If we recall how flesh can exclude solipsism by virtue of an 
interactive relationship and how the artist reveals the body’s potential in 
portraying a world outside our habitual routines, we should see how 
Merleau-Ponty’s anti-Cartesian stance is central to his philosophy of the arts. 
 
Conversation with Others 
 
As mentioned earlier, for Merleau-Ponty there is a dual aspect to perception.  
There is the seer for example and the seen —  those who see the seer from a 
variety of perspectives.  In writing about being in communication with 
others, Merleau-Ponty says:   
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Henceforth as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and 
another person’s are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, 
and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace 
henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously. … There is one particular 
cultural object, which is destined to play a crucial role in the perception of other 
people: language.  In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between 
the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are 
interwoven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called 
forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation 
of which neither of us are the creator.  We have here a dual being, where the 
other is for me no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field nor I 
in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. 32 
 
So then, the notion of a prosthetic applies to those entities we call persons 
and in particular to persons in certain common kinds of conversation, those 
where saying and thinking as in most cases of speaking cannot be 
distinguished and conversation that makes clear the improvisational aspects 
of verbal exchange.  Here, in conversation, is one way the prosthetic effect is 
extremely strong: that our conversational partners are like the prosthetics of 
ourselves.  In his set, The Visible and the Invisible, he says this of Sartre, “He 
became aware that all attempts to live apart were hypocritical because we 
are all mysteriously related, because others see us and so become an 
inalienable dimension of our lives —  become, in fact, ourselves.” 33  And, we 
should recall that for Merleau-Ponty, the body is to be compared not to a 
physical object but to a work of art, a system of meanings “as a focal point of 
living meanings” where the perception of the world is personal and 
unabashedly anthropomorphic. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Breaking with traditional empiricist epistemology, Merleau-Ponty envisions 
an active perceiver that is at times inseparable from a complex and 
intersecting world —  one that folds back upon that perceiver as he/she 
chooses to navigate through it.  Through what I have called a prosthetic 
metaphor, I have hoped to show how Merleau-Ponty’s view of the arts is 
enriched by its use in drawing together, seeing as one, the artist’s body and 
the artistic environment.  The prosthetic helps to explain Merleau-Ponty’s 
view of a diversity of artistic phenomena and experiences, including the 
artistic identity of the artist and his/her work and the performances of the 
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acts of creation and the place of the artist’s roles in time, collapsing temporal 
distance between the artist’s presence and the revisable history of art.  It is a 
perspective that would be seriously impoverished without keeping in mind 
this unlikely metaphor from medical reconstruction.   
With regard to prosthesis, I have distinguished two kinds that are 
relevant to Merleau-Ponty’s various views on art and the artist.  There is, for 
Merleau-Ponty, a practical perceptual immediacy for which the prosthetic 
metaphor is important.  However, there is also the more general, universal 
ontology where the concepts of flesh and chiasm stretch the body’s intimacy 
with the world forming an intimate binary —  a situated body and a 
complex, intersecting world that folds back upon it.  The artist is in the best 
position to capture the results of interrogating a world that beckons to us in 
reversal of meaning from world objects to bodily flesh.  For each kind of 
prosthesis, there is a chronological relevance in that each represents a 
different stage in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking —  especially as contributions to 
his theory of aesthetics and its importance for his philosophy more  
generally.  
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Notes 
I would like to thank John Carvalho, who was my commentator at an Annual 
Meetings of the American Society for Aesthetics when I presented a very 
different version of this paper, and a very helpful editor at Evental Aesthetics. 
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ABSTRACT 
The work of Tara Donovan represents a new aesthetics that manifests the conceptual nuances of 
posthuman thought via material assemblages.  Her work creates a detour that, instead of having 
the fluidity of digital networks as its point of departure, starts with material objects and 
repetition as textual elements that create postnatural landscapes permeated with biomorphic, 
organic, fluid motions that seem to expand our understanding of the natural.  I compare her 
aesthetics to James Bridle’s New Aesthetics.  New Aesthetics embody the technological properties 
of the digital by accumulating virtual traces of material networks, documenting and curating 
various examples of immaterial physicalities.  Tara Donovan’s work represents a reversed form of 
New Aesthetic that, instead of bringing the ‘digital’ into the ‘physical’ in an automated and 
mechanical way, infuses and shapes materials according to the fluid possibilities of the natural — 
organically and meticulously.  Both artistic movements — be it from the virtual into the physical 
or from the natural into the artificial and vice versa — are conducive to a new aesthetic territory:  
a postnatural landscape that manifests as immaterial physicality. 
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We are creating a new nature in the world.  - James Bridle 
 
Introduction 
 
As digital technologies and nanotechnologies reshape our relations to the material 
world, we witness the emergence of immaterial physicality:  “a transfer instantiating 
the immaterial in a physical form, a ‘print-out’ whose tangibility then becomes the 
operative dimension in asserting the presence of an immaterial, digital, 
‘information space.’” 1
It is in this context that I wish to analyze the work of Tara Donovan as 
representative of the aesthetic dimensions of a postnature.3  Having had to come to 
terms with the end of nature  and the death of nature, environmentalism now faces 
the stark realities of climate change and the possible collapse of human 
civilization.4  There is no going back to the purity of classic notions of nature, as it is 
now impossible to separate human, non-human, and inhuman.  Welcome to 
postnature:  a chaotic mesh of uncontrollable geological change set in motion by 
humans.  Postnature is the head-on collision of what was once considered “natural” 
and “artificial.”  It “involves not simply pushing nature to the edges of our 
experience but rather getting inside of life itself and rewriting its genetic 
instructions.” 5  
  In mainstream Western cultures, the informational structure 
and logic of computational code give form and structure to contemporary life as it 
mediates the cultural and political outputs of data networks.  Code shapes the 
noise, visual identity, and political interface of contemporary life.  The artificial 
blends with the natural in such an intimate way that the aesthetic modulations of 
culture become a perfect example of Donna Haraway’s naturecultures:  collective 
expressions created and distributed by a network of agents that operate in a world 
of pervasive and invisible prosthetics connected to the material-semiotic 
assemblages of biological bodies.  If “the machinic and the textual are internal to 
the organic and vice versa in irreversible ways,” then so is their aesthetic. 2 
There are few better examples of the aesthetics of postnature than the 
work of Tara Donovan.  Instead of taking the fluidity of digital networks as its point 
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of departure, her work begins with material objects and repetition as textual 
elements that create postnatural landscapes permeated with biomorphic, organic, 
fluid motions that add a new dimension to natural aesthetics.  Her work “allows the 
shape of the chosen material to determine the form of the piece until it becomes 
magically other ... managing to transcend both materiality and gimmickry in a 
culture that celebrates both.”6  Tara Donovan’s art is able to achieve a double 
aesthetic effect: by subverting and extrapolating the physical properties of 
material objects (density, depth, transparency, smoothness, etc.), she transports us 
into a dimension vibrant with designs that create an overlap between biomorphic 
structures and the genre of technological aesthetics present in contemporary 
computer-generated art.  This aesthetic overlap between the images of her 
biomorphic material objects and digital landscapes of generative art creates yet 
another layer of fusion between the architecture of physical spaces and 
informational spaces —  seamless continuity and flow is made manifest in minute 
detail. 
 
Material Infinity 
My work functions as a field of material that could extend infinitely. 
Tara Donovan  
 
Tara Donovan’s sculptures and installations explore the material properties of 
common objects to create elaborate and meticulous objectscapes that are able to 
evoke the organic aesthetics of flows and forms found in nature.  Her work is 
characterized by a fluidity which is usually only found in natural organic flows – 
even though her materials are industrial, mass-produced, ordinary objects such as 
pins, styrofoam cups, and buttons.  One can sense a silent movement in them 
evoking the mysteries of light and shadows, the ethereal and the translucent, 
expressing immateriality through the properties of matter itself.  Her work is solid 
and precise, rooted in the “pragmatic rigor” of previous artistic movements; 
however “it brings it into our own period by suggesting digital, cellular, emergent 
networks.  It seems to speak to the systems that are shaping our lives.” 7  
     Another significant characteristic of her work is the capacity to materially 
modulate the semiotic qualities of given objects.  Transplanted, a piece in which 
thousands of sheets of tar paper are stacked and ripped to create the effect of a 
flowing sea of solid black marble, is a perfect example:  the patterns and shape of 
the piece’s topography are waves in harmonious flow whereas the sheer volume 
and mass of the piece are reminiscent of the landscape of a valley made of black 
marble.  Matter and meaning are equally modulated to transform and transcend 
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the material properties of her medium.  Tarpaper sheets, originally fragile and 
brittle, become portentous monuments that challenge our perception.  In Tara’s 
own words: 
 
How do I go from an object to something that is more like a field, something where as 
you walk past it, your eye moves over it, and it actually visually shifts?  So that you’re 
looking at the same thing but it’s changing constantly? ... The smaller it is, the choppier 
it seems and the more earthy it looks. Whereas the larger it gets, the more like a sea it 
becomes.8  
 
     Tara Donovan’s work is in many ways a metaphor representing the 
infinite sea of big data and its network aesthetic without utilizing the technologies 
of the digital.  The biomorphic qualities of her work are reminiscent of the 
generative aesthetics of algorithmic art, as in the DIY possibilities of weavesilk.com.9  
Toothpicks and Drawing Pins are examples of her meticulously created works which 
enable us to visualize complex patterns of interaction and object disposition that 
are usually only found in data visualization systems.  The giant mesh of big data 
within which we are all enclosed can be felt pulsating in the background of Tara’s 
installations.  Beyond aesthetic correlations between physical and virtual worlds or 
natural and artificial worlds, Tara’s artistic practice also functions as a scientific 
ground of experimentation with the very properties of matter, using the forces of 
physics as artistic means of creative enunciation.  Toothpicks deploys geometry and 
an intricate network of structural relations designed to surpass the limitations of 
gravity: 
 
What holds the thousands of toothpicks together?  Adhesion — a combination of 
density, friction, and gravity, from which a few stray toothpicks on the floor around the 
base seem determined to escape.  Those errant shards are important to the sculpture, 
however, because they hold the visual key to what could conceivably happen, especially 
in a seismically unstable setting.  In a world that is alive and constantly changing, the 
static sculpture seems to expand beyond its physical limitations, encompassing the 
floor beneath your feet, the room in which you stand and the inherent instability of all 
perceptual experience.10  
      
A different kind of physical expansion can be seen in Bluffs.  Here, piles of 
translucent buttons seem to expand organically much in the same way that fungi, 
yeasts, and molds propagate themselves in nature.  Here, the artist moves past the 
order of geometrical patterns found in nature and proceeds into the disorder of 
biological movement and displicent accumulation.  Chaosmosis, defined as “the 
ensemble of conditions which render possible the emergence of individual and/or 
collective instances as self-referential existential Territories, adjacent, or in a 
delimiting relation, to an alterity that is in itself subjective,” seems to be Tara 
Donovan’s ground of practice and artistic manifestation.11  Through the poetic-
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existential catalysis present in her plastic discursivity, we gain access to emergent 
levels of material enunciation.  Her work is able to transubstantiate the aesthetics 
of biology into that of technology, once again recalling Guattari’s production of 
subjectivity in which “the quality of the base material matters little ... what does 
matter is the mutant rhythmic impetus of a temporalisation able to hold together 
the heterogeneous components of a new existential edifice.” 12 
Such existential edifices —  with boundaries defined by the physical 
constraints of matter itself —  are pregnant with leibhaft: 
 
The carnal presence (leibhaft) of the things themselves answers to the sensuality of the 
intentionality of consciousness.  It is across this sensuality of consciousness ... that 
consciousness approaches the things, that it visits them, and comes into contact with 
them ... sensuous cognition [is] a cognition for which the objects are not just 
intersections of relations, but sensible proximity, dense and carnal presence.13  
     
 Carnal presence encapsulates and manifests “the immaterial physicality of 
the ‘new aesthetic,’ present[ing] a convergence of ... machinic, semiotic, and 
biologic productions.” 14  Tara Donovan’s work is representative of this ‘new 
aesthetic’ which operates via chaosmosis and sensuous cognition.  I dare to 
speculate that the chaosmosis which is blatantly present in Tara’s work occurs not 
in relation to the production of human subjectivity, as in Guattari’s definition of the 
concept, but instead in relation to the production of a postnatural subjectivity, 
materially established and object-oriented, which could be understood as a realm 
of immaterial physicality in itself.  
 
Next Natures 
 
 Koert Van Mensvoort, an artist and philosopher from Amsterdam, has created a 
digital platform dedicated to the concept of next nature.  Next nature represents a 
shift from the traditional dichotomy between the worlds of human technology and 
the natural world, moving forward into a vision of the future in which there is no 
difference between artificial and organic processes.  This vision aims to achieve “a 
balance between both the declining biosphere and the emerging technosphere – 
between old nature and next nature.” 15  Through the concept of next nature, one is 
transported to the fields of Heideggerian thought in its exploration of the origin of 
the work of art as an organic process of creation in which the very essence of the 
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things being made is intrinsically connected to the matter and physicality of such 
things.  This intrinsic connection is made visible by Tara Donovan’s work: 
 
I’m completely relying on the physical properties of the material before me, kind of 
going where it naturally inherently wants me to go, so that things always wind up 
mimicking nature in a way.16  
 
Matter is, for Tara Donovan, a living force of creation that gives direction to 
her practice as an artist, which she often describes as a remanufacturing of the 
intended fate of manufactured materials.  Industrial processes, seen as the very 
antithesis of nature and responsible for the degradation of our planet’s 
ecosystems, are reappropriated by the artist as a new kind of raw material for the 
creation of organic patterns.  In the industrial ashes of nature, the artist seeds the 
emergence of a postnature.  
 
A New Aesthetics of Postnature 
 
 James Bridle has been celebrated as the icon of a new aesthetics of immaterial 
physicalities generated by combining visual landscapes using online digital 
curation.  Network aesthetics is, in James Bridle’s work, represented by the 
“dripping of the virtual into the real” as seen in the materialization of digital 
aesthetics as industrial and 3-D printed objects.17  His new aesthetic is about 
curating shapes, textures, and patterns which were only possible thanks to digital 
technologies and are now made physical by 3-D printing and industrial 
manufacturing.  
 This new aesthetics originates from the virtual and expands into the 
physical, creating an interstitial territory in which both co-exist.  Tara Donovan’s 
work creates the same kind of interstitial territory in which the virtual and the 
physical seem to be intertwined.  However, her work originates from matter itself 
and expands into the virtual by creating fields of sensuous cognition around spatial 
objectscapes which are permeated by the same type of immaterial physicality 
found in Bridle’s work.  It is through the material accumulation and manipulation 
of synthetic and mass-produced objects that Tara Donovan is able to achieve a 
similar aesthetic continuum between material and virtual levels of reality to that 
which James Bridle has been achieving via digital curation.  Both artistic practices 
belong to a social network of industrial consumption that is based on capitalist 
accumulation of images and objects.  Both use accumulation and excess as an 
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aesthetic language.  Both kinds of immaterial physicalities have political 
implications and could be understood as the active operations of a new aesthetic. 
If the work of James Bridle is iconic in regards to a new aesthetic that 
represents the technological properties of the digital by accumulating virtual 
traces of material networks, documenting and curating various examples of 
immaterial physicalities, then Tara Donovan’s work would also be iconic in regards 
to a reversed form of new aesthetic which, instead of bringing the ‘digital’ into the 
‘physical’ in an automated and mechanical way, infuses and shapes materials 
according to the fluid possibilities of the virtual —  organically and meticulously — 
generating in this process a new aesthetic of the postnatural.  Both artistic 
directions —  be it from the virtual into the physical or from the natural into the 
artificial and vice versa —  are currently converging within the new aesthetic 
territory of the postnatural.   
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ABSTRACT 
On both conceptual and methodological levels, this article explores the relationship between 
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy and the work of the poet and visual artist Ian Hamilton Finlay.  At 
the center of Heidegger’s account of experience is the notion of the clearing or the open, a space 
within which and against which entities are “disclosed” or become fully apparent.  The purpose of 
this text is to examine how Finlay’s work might be seen as a response to this Heideggerian 
framework.  In particular we look to the poet’s garden Little Sparta, part of which instantiates 
Heidegger’s vision of the clearing and of the “Holzwege” or “wood paths” that shape it.  We 
demonstrate the way in which Little Sparta sustains a distinctive form of aesthetic inquiry, from 
our initial state of doubt in the Holzwege thicket to a deeper understanding of the process of 
meaning.  
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On both conceptual and methodological levels, this article explores the 
relationship between the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and 
the work of the poet and visual artist Ian Hamilton Finlay (1925–2006).  At 
the center of Heidegger’s account of experience is the notion of the clearing 
(die Lichtung) or the open (das Offene), a space within which and against 
which entities are “disclosed” or become fully apparent. 1,2  Conceptually, this 
clearing can be understood as the context in terms of which meaning or 
sense accrues and through which we thus encounter the world.  Heidegger 
often supplements this metaphor with another, that of binding or gathering.  
He argues for example that the original definition of λόγος, typically 
translated as “word” or “reason,” was a “constant gathering,” a knitting 
together of the world around us.3  He combines this with an emphasis on the 
ability of physical objects in particular to act as focal points around which 
such senses might gather and stabilize – his famous analysis of the jug in 
“The Thing” concludes that the “jug’s presencing,” its capacity to exemplify 
and tie together a way of life, is this “manifold simple gathering.”4  However, 
Heidegger’s discussion of these ideas is marked by repeated warnings about 
the dangers inherent in philosophical treatments of them.  The fundamental 
challenge is to prevent intellectual reflection from distorting or deforming 
the tacit experience of meaning which characterizes our lives.5  He therefore 
suggests that his own work should be read not as demonstrating some set of 
doctrines but rather as pointing back to experience.  “One cannot prove these 
‘theses’,” he writes, “rather, they must prove themselves in phenomenological 
experience itself.”6  Heidegger’s task, as he sees it, is to sustain a mood of 
experience that is attentive enough to the structures that form it – avoiding 
both the “tranquilized” nature of everyday life and the overly intellectualized 
project of much traditional philosophy.7 
 The purpose of this essay is to examine how Finlay’s work might be 
seen as a response to this Heideggerian framework.  In particular we look to 
the garden Little Sparta, created by the poet at his isolated home in the 
Pentland hills, South Lanarkshire.8  This land was formed into a garden for 
and crucially by his artworks from 1966 until his death in 2006.  Finlay openly 
casts part of Little Sparta in terms of Heidegger’s vision of the clearing and of 
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the “Holzwege” or “wood paths” that shape it:  the garden and the objects 
within it model the Heideggerian process of encircling, opening, and 
gathering.  In this sense, at the methodological level, Little Sparta provides a 
guiding thread by which one might envisage the type of phenomenological 
exploration that Heidegger calls for.  Simultaneously, however, discussion of 
Finlay’s garden raises the very dangers of which Heidegger warns – how can 
one adequately capture in a theoretical discussion the physical act of walking 
through the landscape, of moving from one artwork to the next, and of 
returning to the first via another path? 9  One option would be to attempt a 
conceptual analysis of the distinctive nature of physical experience (for 
example, via a discussion of non-conceptual content).  But the concern from 
a Heideggerian point of view is that the discursive nature of such a project 
would automatically skew its conclusions in favor of a misleading 
intellectualism.  We have therefore adopted an alternative approach.  We 
will combine a close description of the physical tenor of the garden – the 
even pacing of one path and the uncertain nature of the next – with a 
structure designed to mirror the cant and topology of the experience.  
Instead of operating within the linearity of a proof, this discussion will map 
the viewer’s progress through Finlay’s Little Sparta, starting in one woodland, 
walking out beyond it, and finding oneself in a second woodland before 
returning to the first. 
 More broadly, the investigation of specific areas of Little Sparta will 
show how Finlay’s practice may be read as taking up and elaborating themes 
implicit in Heidegger’s thought.  For example, Finlay’s work explores violence 
and conflict – themes which are largely suppressed in Heidegger’s magnum 
opus, Sein und Zeit, and yet which come increasingly to the fore in the 
Schwarze Hefte, the recently published notebooks kept by Heidegger from 
the 1930s onwards.10  Ultimately this article aims to show how Finlay as an 
artist and poet both realizes and responds to Heidegger’s philosophy.  In 
doing so, the article explores the nature of aesthetic inquiry, tracking the 
ways in which an artist might engage, extend, and challenge a philosophical 
research program.  Given the scope of the discussion, it will not include all of 
the standard texts of Heideggerian aesthetics such as “The Origin of the 
Work of Art”; rather it focuses on the ideas and passages with which Finlay 
directly engages.  In line with the methodological considerations noted 
above – particularly the concern that philosophical language will “level off” 
experience – this discussion requires a range of approaches and is therefore 
co-authored by a philosopher and a visual artist.11  The hope is that our 
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cooperation will allow us to respect Heidegger’s methodological warnings by 
moving between straightforwardly assertoric and more phenomenological 
or poetic styles.  We begin with Finlay’s foundational engagement with 
Heidegger – with what one might call the Holzwege plinths (Figure 1).12 
 
	
Figure 1.  By courtesy of the Estate of Ian Hamilton Finlay.  
   Photo by Kathleen McKay. 
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An Opening Description 
 
On entering an area of woodland at Little Sparta, it quickly takes a heavy, 
Northern Romantic turn and the wood turns to thicket.  Such qualities were 
described by Finlay as the “Glooms and Solitudes” of the garden.13  Distinct 
from other areas of Little Sparta, which are more open to the sky and views of 
further land, here the evergreen canopy sets the domain of the wood with 
such force that everything beneath appears dark and overwhelmed.  It is 
with a sense of the trees’ claim to their own place that ways through the 
wood are made, quickly subsumed, and ended.  Walking there, we come 
across various sections of track or path; some are cast, others have been laid 
with stone or brick, and some remain earthen.  Yet they appear disjointed, 
and any certainty of course or footing soon passes.    
 It is under these same conditions that Heidegger’s prefacing note to 
the collection of texts entitled Holzwege (Wood Paths) is made: 
	
Holz lautet ein alter Name für Wald.  Im Holz sind  
Wege, die meist verwachsen jäh im Unbegangenen 
aufhören.   
Sie heißen Holzwege.  
Jeder verläuft gesondert, aber im selben Wald.  Oft 
scheint es, als gleiche einer dem anderen.  Doch es 
scheint nur so.  
Holzmacher und Waldhüter kennen die Wege.  Sie  
wissen, was es heißt, auf einem Holzweg zu sein.14 
	
“Wood” is an old name for forest.  In the wood there are paths,  
mostly overgrown, that come to an abrupt stop where the wood is untrodden.   
They are called “wood paths.”  
Each goes its separate way, though within the same forest.  It often  
appears as if one is identical to another.  But it only appears so.   
Woodcutters and forest keepers know these paths.  They know what it means to 
be on a wood path.15  
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The darkness of the wood before us is a destitution in which we now find 
ourselves.  As we move further into the woodland, the darkness increases.  So 
too does the thicket.  Signs and marks become harder to see; things that 
would be points of orientation within the impenetrable mass of branches are 
covered over in the darkness.  
 We come upon three identical plinths along the way, each made 
from a composite stone.  Three inscribed metal plates mounted on top of the 
three successive plinths read:    
	
IN THE WOOD 
ARE PATHS 
WHICH MOSTLY 
WIND ALONG 
UNTIL THEY END 
QUITE SUDDENLY 
IN AN 
IMPENETRABLE THICKET.  
	
THEY ARE CALLED  
WOODPATHS.  
	
OFTEN IT SEEMS 
 AS THOUGH ONE  
WERE LIKE ANOTHER.  
YET IT ONLY  
SEEMS SO.  
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Here on a doubtful path – on finding Finlay’s adaption of Heidegger’s note – 
we approach an understanding of the poetic economy of the woodland 
garden and Finlay’s wider philosophical approach.  In the following 
paragraphs, we look at Finlay’s work in light of Heidegger’s thoughts on the 
role of the poet within the wood’s deep cover and destitution.  Starting from 
Finlay’s formulation of Heidegger’s lines, we follow the route it offers us into 
Heideggerian thought – specifically toward the phenomenology of 
“disclosure.”  We will find that Finlay’s approach has close ties with 
Heidegger’s thinking both with respect to the artwork as a gathering, a point 
at which meaning coalesces, and with respect to the model of progress, 
charted by Finlay’s garden and by Heidegger’s wood paths, from which this 
“gathering” quality arises.  
	
Making Way 
 
The three inscriptions on Finlay’s plinths offer Heidegger’s remarks on 
Holzwege as a succession of passages that end without conclusion.  The 
passage or movement of Heidegger’s text is deliberately re-arranged; 
typographically, Finlay pushes the text to the right-hand limit, visually 
emphasizing the sense of an ending.  Finlay  separates Heidegger’s text into 
three sequential parts, one for each plinth.  The first sets the reader on a way; 
the second establishes something, confirming the reader’s way; the third 
introduces doubt and offers the possibility of a discovery.  The poet 
establishes a route sequentially through the text by moving from plinth to 
plinth.  On first sight, the three equally-spaced plinths set a regular pace and 
imply a step-by-step progression.  But the inscribed text parts us from that 
rhythm:  the last passage turns back on the previous two and questions the 
way of understanding they established.  At this juncture there is something 
for the reader to reconsider.  The poet leaves us in doubt.  Significantly, Finlay 
omits the final lines of Heidegger’s text, leaving them to be discovered.  This 
is what Finlay’s woodland garden will itself come to say to those standing 
within:  “Woodcutters and forest keepers know these paths.  They know what 
it means to be on a Holzweg.” 16  We too will come to know the revelation of 
these lines.  Finlay’s plinths are the point at which we begin to orientate 
ourselves to this and revel in the wider course of this thought.    
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 On making our way through the wood, we will begin to realize the 
poetic progress instantiated there.  For Heidegger, the open is experienced as 
a disclosure, the act of opening up a previously closed space full of meaning.  
It is the poet’s task to bring about this clearing, a revelatory disclosure of 
being in which the world accords to the person, to the extent that he or she 
finds it recast anew.  Finlay’s plinths will model this same understanding of 
the poet:  they will bring the reader into a clearing.  Yet within this shared 
framework of revelation and disclosure, there are tonal differences, and it is 
with these that we need to begin.  Heidegger’s post-war work, as has been 
widely noted, is marked by a valorization of passivity and an almost 
meditative attitude to meaning and the clearing.  In contrast, Finlay is often 
decisive in acts of clearing, accepting the “command” inherent in the poet’s 
advance.  Heidegger himself discusses the poet’s venture and the risks 
involved in the essay “What are poets for?” 17  The quality of being during 
poetic venture, of seeking to rework meaning, is that of being flung loose.  
Being on die Wage, Heidegger writes – using an archaic spelling of Waage – is 
a balance; one may quickly tip one way or another.  Heidegger thus 
associates the path or way (Weg and the archaic verb wegen) with the wager 
(wagen) and risk involved in the instrument of a balance (die Wage).18  A stone 
in the way is a wager around which different routes become weighted.  Risk 
is incipient in the wind of the Holzwege:  “if that which has been flung were to 
remain out of danger, it would not have been ventured.”19  For Finlay, 
pursuing on the natural track at Stonypath – the wider location for his 
creation of Little Sparta – such venture is vital to the poetic task.  Growth is 
met as if it were itself an advance; trees claim ground, and their canopies 
establish dominion, cutting paths short.  Finlay’s works there often respond 
by marking out a domain that seems at first glance to be a rejoinder to 
nature:  predominately through the use of classical motifs, the works impose 
an order and a sharpness that is not only distinctively human but also 
presents itself as a civilizing and rationalizing force.  Simultaneously, 
however, Finlay recognizes an inherent violence in this human drive to order, 
which makes it not so much an alternative to the natural cycle but another 
expression of it.  Indeed, Finlay stated that “conflict is one of the givens of the 
universe.  The only way it can ever be tamed or managed or civilized is within 
the culture.  You cannot pretend that it does not exist.”20  Violence is as much 
part of the cultural or political revolutionary cycle as it is of the natural cycle.  
Little Sparta enforces this view; when we come across gate piers with hand 
grenades as finials, we realize that both the grenade and the more familiar 
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acorn and pinecone which it mirrors are for Finlay isomorphic points within a 
single overarching cycle.21  To take another set of examples, Finlay’s sequence 
of works on the subject of Arcadia, involving Arcadia (1973), Et in Arcadia Ego 
(1976), and Homage to Poussin (1977), all deploy a Panzer as a central image 
and exemplify the poet’s willingness to take on and embed in a natural 
context the interlinked risks of conflict and violence.22  
	
Clearing 
 
The task now is to further develop Finlay’s conception of the clearing.  We 
will see that Finlay’s work while often extremely assertive also contains a 
Heideggerian notion of dwelling, which tempers the confrontational 
character of the artworks that appear in the garden and gives us a more 
coherent impression of Little Sparta as a whole.  In the woodland among the 
natural declarations of tree post and new leaf are Finlay’s poetic declarations 
creating an “intercalary day amid the natural darkness.”23  The poet’s clearing 
comes in several forms.  First it may be found, as we have seen in the 
Holzwege inscriptions, in the form of textual assertion:  Classical lettering is 
carved on numerous objects, foundation stones, and plaques of wood, metal, 
and stone throughout the garden.  There is a forcefulness and finality to the 
assertions, which are most often quotes, short statements, or single-word 
warnings.  The initial declaration often clears a direct path between two 
concepts or entities so that one can fully reach the other.  In Exercise X (1974), 
a booklet made with George L. Thomson, Finlay uses two crossing 
calligraphic lines to compare the ways in which two paths might meet.24  In 
one “X,” an open circular space appears at the point where the two direct 
lines make an abiding bind, each bending in accordance with that meeting.  
Here two ideas become a joint in thought rather than, as another 
demonstrates, strike past one another.  As well as modeling this clearing, “X” 
is the most immediate mark to hand, used for example to indicate the critical 
point of a topography, and also a substitute for that thing that has clearly 
struck the mind but which defies further extrapolation beyond that one clear 
sign.  This “X” therefore brings together several fundamental aspects of the 
clearing as presented at Little Sparta.  Describing the phenomenology of a 
sudden point of poetic concentration and the subsequent attempt to re-
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orientate oneself following it, Finlay wrote:  “that one word was everything… 
it just seems to open onto another possibility completely.”25  Finlay plays here 
on the sense in which that clear revelation whilst eluding our discursive 
abilities might be opened up by a single word, for which “X” stands.  This calls 
to mind Heidegger’s 1959 lecture “The Word” on Stefan George’s 1928 poem 
of the same title, which describes the poet’s experience of such a word:  “they 
are words by which what already is and is believed to be is made so concrete 
and full of being that it henceforth shines and blooms and thus reigns.” 26  We 
will return to this sense of fullness and subsequent reign.  
We can now turn to a second example of Finlay’s modeling of the 
clearing:  concretion of the clearing action and the physical and ideological 
way it clears appears in the form of an axe.  Finlay placed the object of an axe, 
made in 1985, in the Garden Temple of Little Sparta.27  Inscribed on the handle 
is the declaration: 
	
HE SPOKE LIKE AN AXE • BARÈRE ON SAINT-JUST 
	
Louis Antoine Léon de Saint-Just (1767–1794) was a central figure in the 
French Revolution’s “Reign of Terror.”  The incisive impression that Saint-
Just's speech left on Bertrand Barère is made in turn on Finlay’s axe.  Saint-
Just’s speech cut through doubt in the minds of his audience, creating 
connections between disparate drives and visions and thus made things 
clear.  A later axe made by Finlay in 1987 concisely articulates the essence of 
this idea (Figure 2).28  On the head is inscribed “acte” (act), and on the handle 
at the point at which one would grip in order to swing the axe is “idée” (idea).  
The close-coupled words carved on this one, functional object relate their 
inextricably bound purpose as coincident makers of a way.  The swiftness of 
the clearing axe also relates the suddenness of poetic disclosure brought by 
such a word or phrase, as Finlay described, and the permanence of that mark 
embedded in the mind.   
The Holzwege of Heidegger and Finlay 
Volume 5 Number 1 (2016)   69   
 
Figure 2. Photo by John Andrew. Courtesy of the artist. 
The violence and clarity represented by Finlay’s axe – an archaic 
weapon and deforesting technology – manifest what Heidegger called 
“repetition”:  a return to the past to identify resources that one might use to 
determine the present.29  Here the object, the axe, functions as a tightly 
gathered form that inherently retains its cultural position.  This upholds a 
class of object in the vein of those made by Daedalus – a classification that 
was dominant in early Greek thought and which Heidegger echoed in his 
description of the object as a gathering point of sense.  This type of object – a 
daidalon – was asserted wholly, a persistent gathering:  a highly wrought 
form in which the object’s exterior appearance was consistent with its 
inbound purpose.  Objects made in this vein could be swiftly and decisively 
redeployed by Finlay, their purpose having remained vital.  In Finlay’s garden 
setting, figures such as Saint-Just make way with these instruments and 
tools, cultivating the ground assertively, forcibly even.  
	
Tempering Violence 
 
The initial incisive point of the Saint-Just wood axe widens; a tempered, 
more pastoral aspect follows.  This occurs first in the axe’s proximity to the 
other objects in the Garden Temple.  Many have been sanctified there as 
instantiations of the actions involved in seasonal turns such as the bee hive 
and flower vase.  Yet our view of the axe and several scythes in the Garden 
Temple may turn color when we realize that they mark words spoken by a 
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figurehead who was beheaded: Saint-Just’s own death was by guillotine.  
Elsewhere, a different functional and seasonal object – a watering can – 
weeps for Saint-Just, its inscription recording the date of his birth and death.  
It offers solace in the form of rain that breaks the heat of high summer and 
thus reminds us that Saint-Just's death was a tipping point in the French 
Revolutionary calendar:  his execution was part of the Thermidorian 
Reaction.  The Revolutionary calendar is also deeply governed by turns in 
nature's cycle, mirroring the cyclical aspect of Finlay’s understanding of 
history discussed above.  The break of summer’s peak is declared by a 
lightning strike, the force of which heralds rain and the harvest to come.  
Indeed, Saint-Just’s execution marked the end of the Reign of Terror:  the 
extremely violent, most radical phase of the French Revolution and a 
watershed moment in the revolutionary process.  The lightning strike is a 
repeated motif elsewhere in Finlay’s work — for example in the mutation of 
a lightning bolt’s shape from the ff of musical force towards the final, violent 
force of the Third Reich's SS in a work from the booklet SF (1978)30 and again 
in the mutation of the form of a sickle’s blade in the lithograph 
Sickle/Lightning Flash (1990).31 
Thus the wood axe is used as an instrument with which to forcefully 
cut back to the French Revolution, but it also leads to a re-establishment, 
prolonging those movements’ spirits and values here in Finlay’s garden, 
where they may abide.  As we have seen, the manner and spirit of this re-
establishment is a re-armament in the case of Saint-Just.  From this point on, 
following the axe, a revolution of sorts comes about at Stonypath.  Finlay 
defined his statement of intent in Revolution, n. (1986), a lithograph produced 
with Gary Hincks, thus:  “REVOLUTION n.  a scheme for the improving of a 
country; a scheme for realizing the capabilities of a country.  A return.  A 
restoration.  A renewal.”32  We have seen how the redeployment of an object 
of war and revolution has a necessarily violent point for Finlay from which 
new poetic lands are borne and cultivation and civilization unfold.  Incised 
objects highlight the poet’s cutting advances in pursuit of such a return.  
Through concise inscription, Finlay rebinds — or in Heideggerian terms 
“repeats” — parts of earlier thought in our contemporary world, cutting 
through thicket.  
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Gathering 
 
Finlay’s engagement with the French Revolution forms one part of what 
theorist and fellow Concrete poet Stephen Bann called his “poetic 
cosmology”; a complex framework which locates the French Revolution, 
German Romanticism, and the Third Reich as developments and mutations 
of Greco-Roman values.33  It is to this Classical fulcrum of Finlay’s work that 
we will now turn; as will become clear, his practice here links the conception 
of the clearing explored above to one of the notions that underlies it in 
Heidegger’s own work, that of the Classical object.  At Little Sparta, Finlay 
seeks to re-affirm aspects of Classical thought – more specifically Classical 
values – and their rigorous assertion through action.  Thus Finlay not only 
selects objects that are Classical, he selects the most longstanding objects of 
the Classical world:  column, capital, temple, marble bust and stone 
inscription.  There is a force to many of the clear-cut forms asserted by the 
poet, objects dominant and certain of their place.  This builds on the notion 
of the daidalon introduced above:  such objects are a gathering or 
concentration of truth; they penetrate the mind intact and established 
meaning there.  The material density of a longstanding object goes hand in 
hand with the sharpness of any inscription thereupon.  Hence in Finlay’s 
word-bearing object there is twofold clearance:  by the clear-cut form of the 
object and by the incisive poetic inscription.   
The density of Finlay's word-bearing objects is both a function of the 
phenomenological instilment of the poetic disclosure, which allows us to 
suddenly “see” something, and a function of the extent to which there 
develops and dwells an investment of bind, a gathering in the Heideggerian 
sense, a coalescence of meaning, which has reached a concretion of form.  
Thus density of material and certainty are tied together in direct relation to 
the semantic and conceptual binds thereby held.  But this sense of the 
inbound rigor of such objects is hard to retain, Heidegger warns: 
	
Our thinking has of course long been accustomed to understate [sic] the nature of 
the thing.  The consequence, in the course of Western thought, has been that the 
thing is represented as an unknown X to which perceptible properties are 
attached.  From this point of view, everything that already belongs to the gathering 
nature of this thing does, of course, appear as something that is afterward read 
into it.  Yet the bridge would never be a mere bridge if it were not a thing.34 
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How should we think about Finlay’s plinths without applying a “reading” 
after the fact of the artwork?  Heidegger continues, offering a useful point: 
	
What the word for space, Raum, Rum, designates is said by its ancient meaning.  
Raum means a place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging.  A space is 
something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, 
namely within a boundary, Greek peras.  A boundary is not that at which 
something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which 
something begins its presencing.35 
	
As in a woodland clearing, so too here in this new clearing created by the 
artwork’s presence, disclosure allows being to dwell and become apparent.  
In phenomenological terms, the art object forms a boundary – its clearing – 
the space within which meaning occurs.  Under these metaphysical 
conditions, by its very existence, the art object is a gathering:  being has an 
“incipient power gathering everything to itself, which in this manner releases 
every being to its own self.” 36  In the artwork, the thing's own binds, its 
capacity to tie strands to the point of coherent unity, subsist there with such 
purchase that it has a hard, certain quality.  By laying down a Classically 
Greek boundary in the sense mapped by Heidegger, a thing is bound to be 
fulfilled:  the objects of Classical art as he conceived them were points at 
which the concretion of meaning occurred, points at which the physical form 
of the object was sharp enough to mark a space of understanding.  When it 
reaches a state of being fully bound, the thing comes to fruition and “reigns.”  
Thus fullness is vital.    
 This restored object’s reign exerts a gravity on its surrounding field, 
recasting lines of thought in accordance to the object.  Admittance can be 
gained by being on the way of or following the “draw” to such a gathering.  
Thus it is through the effect of the object on its surrounding domain – not by 
“reading into” the object – that we come to know the object more than its 
tightly gathered state allows.  We come to see that Finlay’s word-bearing 
objects are, to paraphrase the poet Edwin Morgan, constructions that hold.37  
There is a creation of a new poetic order around such points of anchor, which 
harness other cultural fields to our own.  Surrounding the artwork, the paths 
in Finlay’s garden become deeper and wider, more certain of their way; some 
are even laid with stone.  Thus it comes to pass that, around the single point 
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of an artwork, the poet becomes “sure of his word, and just as fully in 
command of it.”38 
 Therefore, Finlay answers Heidegger’s appeal not only in his choice 
of objects but also by the manner in which they exist in the garden and 
hence by our approach to them, which is also gathering by nature.  It is 
precisely the poet’s task to create clear opportunities, which will lead us to 
dwell intently in the manner described by Heidegger.  This is an inevitable 
consequence of our innate state of bind; bound here only temporarily, we 
“must ever learn to dwell.” 39  
	
What the Woodcutters and Forest Keepers Know 
 
When we come across Finlay’s Holzwege plinths in the woodland garden, we 
find this point around which to orientate.  From these incisive plinths unfolds 
a more gradual wind – a contemplative re-working – as the gravity of the 
certain object goes to work on the doubtful thicket surrounding it.   
 Finlay’s garden and the pull of the word-bearing objects placed there 
begin to reveal what Heidegger’s woodcutters and forest keepers know.  As 
we walk there, the wood paths – disjointed parts of a path in doubt – start to 
cohere.  The axe in the temple, the objects surrounding it, the longer draws of 
Classicism and French Neo-Classicism:  these exert draws on our 
understanding and recast the wind of paths we develop around the Holzwege 
plinths.  It starts to make sense that there would be sections of deeply 
grooved tank tracks marking one way to the plinths.  The woodcutters and 
forest keepers know why the wood paths make a certain pattern of 
movement apparent on the ground; they have made way there in the wood.   
 Here is what the woodcutters know:  that it is their process of 
clearing that governs the paths that draw us into the open.  Once we see the 
disclosure in the wood clearing, what seemed to be doubtful ways now 
manifest the economy of the woodland.  The necessary precedence and 
violence of the poetic disclosure is realized in Finlay’s axe, after which the 
wood paths are deepened in accordance with the newly disclosed open, cut 
trees borne along and pulled out along certain lines.  Paths, once uncertain, 
now deliver the clearing to us.  The poet has shown us what it is to be on a 
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Holzweg.  Thus it comes to be that Finlay’s woodland enacts the poet’s task in 
the world as described by Heidegger:  the processes of cutting, disclosure, 
and establishment of dwelling deliver the revelation promised in the 
Holzwege inscription.  The artwork establishes a foundation stone that 
functions as a joint in thought, allowing a wider field to unfold in accordance 
to the object.  The cohering operation it performs on the wider garden is not 
achieved by introducing some new or external model of unity but rather, as 
Heidegger identified, by making visible connections that already belong to 
the gathered nature of the object.  The poet’s thought there dwells and by 
that dwelling gains a deepening hold on the ground, answering Heidegger’s 
call “to bring dwelling to the fullness of its nature.”40  We may find this in the 
poet’s expanding territory, in the more tightly wrought bent of paths in the 
established garden, and in the flattened areas of earth around an artwork, 
where approaches gather.  It is by poetry’s nature that this progressive 
dwelling develops:  “poetry that thinks is in truth / the topology of Being.”41  
With each persistent mark on wild land, the garden’s poetic scope and 
potential territory enlarge.  To the forest keeper and poet, the woodland is 
now increasingly bound to disclose.  Thus the larger artwork of Little Sparta 
begins to emerge – and with it Finlay’s conception of being in the world.  
	
Figure 3.  By courtesy of the Estate of Ian Hamilton Finlay.  
  Photo by Kathleen McKay. 
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Another Way 
 
On a path descending from the peak of Little Sparta, we approach another 
patch of woodland, located just beneath the summit of the garden.  Finlay 
proposes an alternative route though this wood.  As if stating a founding 
tenet, a plaque is fixed to the first dominant tree establishing this new 
territory (Figure 3).42  It reads:  
	
All the noble 
sentiments of my heart, 
all its most praiseworthy 
impulses – I could give them 
free rein, in the midst of 
this solitary wood.43 
	
The heart and woodland are aligned.  This “solitary” wood – alone, a unity – is 
tied-off from other parts, is something sole.  A concordance begins to take 
hold, which increasingly positions both heart and woodland as gatherings:  
both are solitary thickets.  The dark density of Finlay’s woodlands and the 
impossibility of any new opening in the heart’s mass of branching parts align 
the two closer still.  Resonances between heart and woodland are perhaps 
most notably traced to Homer who described the heart as close-textured, 
highly bound, or bushy in quality.44  Plato understood that the lungs took on 
the impact of the “leaping” heart – cushioning it – their volume thick with 
branches.45  Thus the lungs’ many branches and pathways developed in 
response to the heart’s one insistently set and highly bound passage.  The 
bushy nature of the heart was thus thought to map the extent and quality of 
its awareness as the seat of consciousness within the body.46  The reign of the 
heart within the body becomes palpable as does its curiously involved 
autonomy there. 
 This sense of the heart’s reign may reach a critical point at which it 
seems to turn against us; we dwell in the world only to the extent that the 
heart allows.  The bounds of the heart not only delineate the physical extent 
of its bleeding field through the body but also delimits the duration of that 
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hold.  The form of the heart is felt to repeat an inbound rhythm that 
sometimes sits like a stranger in the body, throwing its weight about.   
 This may prompt the poet to revolt.  For example, the poet Theodore 
Roethke defies the heart and its boasting dominance, describing it as a “knot 
of gristle”:  old, over-wrought, and assuming.47  He questions the 
authoritative position that the heart is said to hold as the primary seat of 
being or seat of the first nutritive soul.  Here, poetic “free rein” – abundant 
and expansive in its course – makes way in defiance of the one ingrained way 
of the heart, which goes over the same course again.   
	
After Counter-Revolt, Louvet 
 
Having turned against the idea of the heart as a thicket, we reconsider the 
route proposed by Finlay through the wood before us, returning to Finlay’s 
plaque and the different area of woodland it introduces.  Once inside and in 
contrast to the dark Holzwege thicket, this woodland is lighter, full of young, 
deciduous trees, yearlings, and in parts has the appearance of a coppice.  The 
author of the passage quoted on the plaque at Figure 3 is Jean-Baptiste 
Louvet de Couvrai (1760–1797), who came to hold a position post-
Thermidorian Reaction.  This point in the French Revolution was a revolt 
against the extreme violence of the Reign of Terror that led to a turn towards 
a non-reactionary, more temperate way, curbing the counter-violence of 
figures such as Saint-Just.  Here Finlay hints at an alternative course of action 
towards insight – towards disclosure – and puts down Saint-Just’s axe.   
 Finlay’s Louvet plaque establishes a post-Thermidorian Reaction 
position both in accordance to the former figures we have explored and in 
the form of the woodland’s terrain.  We may remember the objects in the 
Garden Temple devoted to Saint-Just and the clearing action they were 
devoted to and also the watering can dedicated to Saint-Just.  After this peak 
of terror follows the water’s run:  here is Louvet’s landscape.  The path 
through the wood now before us is downhill, closely following the course of a 
stream, tipped from the peak behind us and flowing from a full reservoir 
high in the garden.  The nature of Louvet’s “rein” is said by the text to be free.  
It follows that the water through the Louvet wood makes a gradual passage, 
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easing its way and pooling.  A more intricate relation is wrought between 
land and water alongside which our path winds.   
	
Free Rein 
 
We can see that Finlay has built a territory of meaning with a different turn 
in nature in the Louvet wood, and when we consider this terrain in 
combination with other figures of the French Revolution chosen by the poet, 
we recognize a wider topology of being at Little Sparta.  Louvet’s passage 
though the wood is perhaps comparable to the way in which Heideggerian 
meaning is gained; made on the way, its grip on the ground deepens with 
being’s inherence in the world.  Yet Louvet’s grip is weak.  Washed-out and 
sentimental in comparison to the clearings created by Saint-Just’s axe, 
Louvet’s passage is far more defined by the established extremes of 
Revolutionary and counter-Revolutionary positions than by any will of his 
own.  The way through the Louvet woodland is conciliatory and hardly 
creates clearings; rather, the course settles on its way via the least contested 
pass, following the course of water.  Louvet has free rein only within 
uncontested territory.    
 If cutting and clearing are not active here in the Louvet wood, how 
can insight be gained?  One option would be to trace the idea of “free rein” 
back through Heidegger’s own widely discussed use of “walten,” meaning “to 
prevail” or “to let rule.”  Heidegger himself uses “walten” to capture the 
process of a coming to presence that establishes a context of meaning, which 
creates a context in terms of which other objects are understood and so 
“reigns.”48  This is precisely the process discovered via the Holzwege plinths in 
the first half of this article.  There is an implicit violence in the term, a 
violence borne out by its cognates such as the deeply ambiguous “Gewalt”; 
standardly “violence” but in many contexts something closer to “legitimate 
authority.”49  In the contrast between the Holzwege and Louvet woodlands, we 
see Finlay working with this type of tension:  the freedom that Louvet attains, 
his “free rein,” exists only where dominant territories will allow.  Again 
Finlay’s greater willingness to recognize the interpenetration of “walten” and 
“Gewalt” is apparent; the freedom Louvet gains is generated and dominated 
by the cyclical process of revolution and the violent assertion of meaning 
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exemplified by figures such as Saint-Just.  Yet there is also an alternative 
route that will ultimately bring us back to and further illuminate the idea of 
disclosure:  the heart’s way.  
	
The Heart and the Thicket 
 
The significance of metaphors based on the heart deepens in Heideggerian 
aesthetics, where it must be conceived outside of a purely biological 
discourse.  Heidegger states:  “the widest orbit of beings becomes present in 
the heart's inner space.”50  The heart is an open:  an auditorium within which 
being’s way resounds and is discovered.  Thus the heart becomes a device 
that, inherently attuned to the throws and pitches of being, will gain insight.  
The heart’s hold over the body no longer sounds estranged nor 
authoritarian; instead it accurately gauges the way in which we dwell:  “the 
whole of the world achieves here an equally essential presence in all its 
drawings.”51  Recognition of the heart’s involvement ties the artist’s methods 
closer still to the Heideggerian instruction that we “must ever learn to 
dwell.”52 
 Curiously, a work by Finlay may have anticipated this connection.  
Woodpaths (1990) is a small booklet in which Finlay restates the first two 
parts of the Holzwege inscription.53  He adds a last, third passage of his own 
making:  
	
 “In the wood are paths which 
 mostly wind along until they end 
 quite suddenly in an impenetrable 
 thicket.” 
	
 “They are called woodpaths.” 
	
 They are paths where the heart and  
  the foot walk hand in hand.54 
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For Heidegger, the manner in which being is discovered is grounded in the 
explorative disclosure of the world; meaning is made on the way, on and by 
the foot at Stonypath.  By fixing the Louvet plaque to the first tree, Finlay “re-
cognizes” the heart’s way in the woodland that follows and provides further 
ground for this alternative Heideggerian course towards clearing.  
	
Resonance 
 
We have found that a rhythm has built between the heart’s thicket and the 
wood’s thicket.  One crucial emphasis that arises is on their common 
isolation.  When pitched together, two distinct unities – wood and heart – 
can build a familiarity of meaning.  The heart’s thicket and the wood’s thicket 
develop, and we become attuned to their common binds – their 
concordances – between the two.  When the two are set to work together, 
meaning that is incipiently gathered within each thing can be realized 
outside of its individual bounds.  
 Between solitary and fixed artworks resonance builds; concordances 
between the two things bind them increasingly.  As these points coincide, 
they coalesce, holding things in relation.  Indeed, Finlay made the role of 
resonance clear, stating that he thought of poetry “in terms of the resonant 
image, and it is precisely this resonance which animates and justifies the 
surrounding space.”55  A resonant image gathers meaning towards it.  From a 
Heideggerian perspective, this idea is fundamentally linked to that of 
atmosphere or mood.  Heidegger’s preferred term for these – Stimmung – is 
deliberately and naturally read as “resonance” or “tuning.”56  In this sense, 
Finlay’s remark that “superior gardens are composed of Glooms and 
Solitudes and not of plants and trees” captures the Heideggerian process 
through which a mood attunes in a certain way, making certain things 
apparent.57  Atmosphere does not occlude:  it is the air’s pitch turned toward 
the persistent object.  For Heidegger, therefore, atmosphere is a cultivating 
substance in which we are “trans-planted” and in which meaning grows.58 
 We have found resonance not simply within a single aspect of the 
garden terrain but a resonance between two distinct parts:  the Holzwege 
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wood and the Louvet wood.  In working together, the woods illuminate 
aspects both of the open and of the manner in which meaning is gained:  in 
turn on the way, strikingly, or resoundingly through concordance.   
	
In Conclusion 
 
By engaging with Finlay’s response to Heidegger, we have demonstrated how 
Little Sparta sustains a distinctive form of aesthetic inquiry – from the initial 
state of doubt in the Holzwege thicket to a deeper understanding of 
meaning’s progress.  The works of art located in Finlay’s garden and the form 
of garden surrounding them, as exemplified by the interaction of the 
Holzwege and Louvet woods, all serve to model the way of meaning traced by 
Heidegger.  In this sense our study has sought to discover Finlay’s description 
of his own work as “a model, of order, even if set in a space which is full of 
doubt.”59  
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ABSTRACT 
If we wish to think experience primarily as a relational dimension in which dynamic forces are 
activated, then we may need to conceive the body as both a crossroads and a threshold across 
which events burst forth.  First, the body is a crossroads of virtual lines of affection where 
consciousness becomes a with-ness in which bodies-things-percepts-sensations collide:  
intertwined movements of becoming.  But it is also a threshold because the body is a 
multidimensional place where events are reported – or not.  Like a black hole, it is constantly 
attracting affectivities and engulfing them:  it is affected by its surroundings.  But what 
becomes of these affectivities?  The body is not just a black hole; it is also a musical 
instrument:  it resonates with its surrounding, emitting affective forces through the pulsation 
of its presence.  The body is affected as much as it affects its situation.  To conceive experience 
as an aesthetic process contributes to an acknowledgement of the affective dimension of 
experience in the process of communication, thus allowing sense to be felt as an event. 
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On Consciousness-With 
To begin with, a “simple” question:  what is consciousness, and where is it located?  
In my work, I put great emphasis on conceiving the human body as a plane of 
emergence of aesthetic qualities.  I refer to it, inspired by Erin Manning, as a 
becoming-body.1  By this expression I mean that the body is not a materiality linked 
to a predetermined identity.  Instead, I conceive the human body as an organism 
that persons.  To illustrate how “person” may function as a verb, Arakawa and Gins 
explain that “other types of organisms dog, giraffe, or cockroach the world.”2  These 
examples allow us to better grasp “being” as a movement:  namely, a becoming.  
Action is intrinsic to it: “being” is a “doing.”  What is it that the becoming-body is 
doing?  Moving and sensing: basically, experiences are happening.  There is no such 
thing as a witness-consciousness but only movement and becoming sensing itself.  
In the essay “Does ‘Consciousness’ exist?”, William James conceptually addressed 
what we today call embodiment by suggesting experience as a synonym for 
consciousness. 3  He argues that although consciousness and body may be 
considered as contrasted to each other in philosophy (as in “spirit and matter” or 
“soul and body”), this dualism is out of balance as long as consciousness stands for 
an entity.  He insists instead in consciousness as a function:  knowing.  In this 
context, consciousness ceases to be considered as an abstract fixed substance 
acting as a witness of the events happening to the body.  What is at stake here is 
the relationality of the body as a set of pure experiences, a relational field.  Therefore 
what is being put forward is a care for the processual continuity of “thoughts” and 
“things” instead of their classic distinction as separate entities.    
If consciousness is experience, then the entire becoming-body is 
consciousness.  As experience, consciousness is a relational dimension of the 
becoming-body:  a consciousness-with.  When we are swimming, for example, we 
experience a dynamic unity of “being together” as an attunement of rhythms and 
movements that produces a merging-with experience.  What happens here is 
relation emerging, and we may say that Flow is the force activated by the being-
with-water experience.  Therefore the concept consciousness-with attempts to 
attend to the relational dimension of experience.  It assumes the point of view of 
the relation as a point of coagulation, entanglement, and subjectivity as it has been 
foregrounded in process philosophy by authors such as William James, A. N. 
Whitehead, and more recently Brian Massumi, Erin Manning, and Arakawa and 
Gins, who take relation as their starting point.  In James’ terms, this centrality of 
relation is what defines “radical empiricism” as opposed to classical empiricism, 
which starts from discrete entities.  As such, the idea being articulated here is not 
about a general oceanic flow that would direct the movements of the body 
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immersed in it.  More specifically, Flow refers to the singular quality emerging in 
that situation as relationality.  
The perception of immersion arises not only through the activity of all my 
five senses but also through a sixth one – or we could say through a virtual 
complement to what is actually happening perceptually. Here, “virtual” is not 
opposed to “actual” but should be understood as a dimension of experience which 
is felt in the body and at all moments present as potential.  In fact, as Alfred North 
Whitehead points out, our sense-perception is always fused with non-sensuous 
perception: 
 
In human experience, the most compelling example of non-sensuous perception is our 
knowledge of our own immediate past.  I am not referring to our memories of a day 
past, or of an hour past, or of a minute past.  Such memories are blurred and confused 
by the intervening occasions of our personal existence.  But our immediate past is 
constituted by that occasion, or by that group of fused occasions, which enters into 
experience devoid of any perceptible medium intervening between it and the present 
immediate fact.  Roughly speaking, it is that portion of our past lying between a tenth of 
a second and half a second ago.  It is gone, and yet it is here.  It is our indubitable self, the 
foundation of our present existence.4 
 
Non-sensuous perception refers to a wider aspect than our sense-perception.  It 
senses the background and the foreground of an actual experience, fusing all this 
data into a singular feeling:  the affective tone of a situation.5  This wider aspect of 
perception allows us to think consciousness-with through two facets:  multiplicity 
and virtuality.  
 At the contact of water, the becoming-body holds to that situation as it 
responds to it.  In this context, the verb “to hold” is indebted to the writings of 
Arakawa and Gins, particularly as it is used in Architectural Body where they develop 
a theory of perception.  The latter aims to attend to relationality’s full potential as it 
has the power to reconfigure life.  Their main concept, landing site, refers to the fact 
that every perception lands (as a process) on a defined site (situation).  This landing 
is an act of apportioning out, in other words, a sorting out (Whitehead would call it 
prehension) of experience.  Every perception is a landing site, “each holding of the 
world equaling a landing-site configuration.”6  Thus, as the becoming-body holds to 
the being-in-the-water situation, the movements that run through the whole 
relational event provide support for the floating situation.  At a virtual level, they 
are attuned to the relationality between the becoming-body and the element 
water as virtual lines of affection allowing this relational event to emerge.  The 
consequence of this relationality is the Flow as a center where sensations, 
perceptions, emotions, and lines of tension (as floating-sinking and other forces) 
collide.  Thus, the relational event hosts a multiplicity.  There is a virtual crowd 
swarming here, which is endowed with a common objective:  the event.  There is no 
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simple, dualistic relation between water and a becoming-body.  Instead, there is a 
more-than-human situation arising through the holding together of a relational 
complex.  The Flow is this more-than-human situation.  It is a relational event:  a 
singularity emerging through experience which carries an affective tone.  The event 
is the real subject of the relation, the being of relation.  This is why I call it a more-
than-human situation.  The becoming-body contributes to its existence but is not 
its main element:  this is why I speak of a consciousness-with.  It is this activity of 
co-creation between the becoming-body and water that allows the Flow to emerge 
as a singularity.  The multiple affective memories of the being-in-the-water 
situation are sensed in the becoming-body as a felt synthesis of these virtual lines 
of affection.  Its complexity expresses itself in experience as an aesthetic quality.  
When aesthetics is understood from a relational point of view, we see the 
becoming of experience as an ontogenetic process of in-formation of felt qualities.  
In this regard, it is “aesthetic in its multidimensionality.” 7  How does this happen? 
 
The Becoming-Body as a Crossroads:  Becoming-Actual  
 
As the becoming-body jumps into the water, the sensation on the skin activates 
water-affective memories.  There is a gathering of virtual lines of water-affection 
emerging as the immersion-event happens.  These multiple being-in-the-water 
affective memories arise in experience to gather heterogeneously as a passive 
synthesis.8  They are passive because they are not actively operated but gathered in 
an emergent holding together that is aligned by the event as it happens.  As Henri 
Bergson describes the interpenetration of affective memories, he affirms that they 
self-organize to penetrate each other as the notes of a melody do, forming thus a 
qualitative multiplicity.9  This multiplicity of virtual lines of water-affection subsists 
as part of a virtual dimension of the becoming-body:  I call it affective-consciousness.  
Every time a becoming-body is immersed in water, an affective memory of a being-
in-the-water situation is registered as experience.  Each affective memory acts as a 
complex, oscillating virtual line of affection in experience.  Within every immersion-
situation, there is the emergence of a real potentiality:  sensations, perceptions, 
emotions, floating-sinking, and other forces coming together into a certain 
conditioned indetermination. 10  In this specific situation, the real potentiality finds its 
determination as the Flow.  This emergence of potentiality befitting the becoming 
of the immersion-event is conditioned by affective memories combined with the 
law of gravity, the capacity of the becoming-body to float, among other human and 
non-human conditioning forces.  This real potentiality arising through the 
experience of being-with-water becomes tangible as relationality.  In the 
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emergence of relationality, the water-affective-memories arising through the 
contact of water throw themselves towards the actualization of experience.  At the 
contact of water they are all here, present in experience, so ready to forge the 
singularity ready to bloom.  These are the virtualities of the relational complex.  
The consequence of the relationality that they compose is the Flow as a virtual 
center where multiple conditioning forces co-create the event.  Consciousness-with 
is thus the co-creation of relationality and is located not only everywhere in the 
becoming-body but also “in” the event.  Understanding the relational complexity of 
the Flow’s emergence allows us to better grasp the virtual movement of becoming-
actual in act.  
 As it is very difficult to discern one single experience, we could refer to it as 
a constellation of events.11  Events constantly burst into existence by passing 
through our becoming-bodies as cars come and go on highways.  Every event that 
blooms in our actuality brings forth into existence a highway:  a virtual line of 
affection, which is in fact an affective multiplicity.  This movement of actualization 
lies at the core of the fact of being alive.   
At any given moment, singularities are coming into existence with the 
potential to actualize aesthetic qualities by affecting becoming-bodies.  When I am 
in the water, for instance, the temperature of that environment is affecting me.  
There is as well a characteristic smell that drives my senses to a specific feeling.  
Perhaps a “soothing sensation” is coming to my awareness?  The sound of the waves 
adds to this sensorial symphony a note of lullaby.  What about that deep turquoise 
color unique to the Caribbean’s tropical beaches?  Is there a word to express the 
feeling of overwhelming well-being granted by such a situation?  A word is never 
enough because in the event there is so much happening at the same time.  Every 
micro-event composing a Sea-event acts as a virtual line of affection — or in other 
words, multiple intertwined movements of becoming.  Here, bodies-things-
percepts-sensations collide in a with-ness.  They combine with virtual affective 
memories to bring forth the singularity of the actual event.  
 
The Becoming-Body as a Threshold:  Becoming-Virtual 
 
So to speak, something extraordinary happens:  experience.  The becoming-body in 
this consciousness-with event gathers a multiplicity of virtual lines of affection into 
one singular complex feeling:  the being-with-water experience.  In Whitehead’s 
vocabulary, we would say that the process through which this complex feeling 
emerges consists in the water experiencing itself as an actual occasion:  “the final 
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real things of which the world is made up.”12  Thus, even though the becoming-body 
is a crucial aspect of the process, this microscopic view of the event does not 
consider the human element to be the subject of the process but a catalytic agent.  
The subject becomes then the event experiencing itself through the actualization 
of a singular affective tonality.  In the process of experiencing, the becoming-body 
engulfs small details through a movement that virtualizes what had been brought 
forth into actualization.  It does not disappear:  it subsists as affective-memories 
(potentialities for other Sea-event situations).  These bits of experience pass 
through the becoming-body as they would reach an event horizon.  It means that 
the becoming-body acts as the threshold of an affective black hole attracting these 
virtual lines of affection for creative purposes.  As Massumi states, “there is an 
incorporeal dimension of the body.  Of it, but not it.  Real, material, but incorporeal.  
Inseparable, coincident, but disjunct.”13  This incorporeal dimension, affective-
consciousness, subsists through a myriad of passive synthesis:  the coming together 
as a relational field of affectivities emerging through the event.  What then 
becomes of these affectivities?  As much as there is an action of the water-system 
on the becoming-body, there is also a simultaneous “being-with” of the becoming-
body that acts upon the water-system.  Relation.  By vibrating the relation-tonality 
(relationality), the becoming-body brings a complex of feelings-sensations-
emotions to existence:  an immersion-event happens.  The being-with of this 
immersion situation produces a differenciation in the most basic action of the 
becoming-body:  the pulsation of its presence.14  This pulsation is constantly 
slightly changing to harmonize itself with the aesthetic qualities of its 
environment.  The becoming-body feels these affective tonalities as it co-creates 
them:  that is consciousness-with.  This very act is an attunement that constantly 
adjusts and vibrates affectivity.  In this sense, we could call the becoming-body a 
musical instrument.  What is the music that it is playing? 
 
 
Reflective and Affective-Consciousness:  A Delicate Dance 
 
The becoming-body is always emanating affect.  The latter can be felt but not 
named as affect is a non-verbal language.  Irrevocably though, we try to grasp — 
retrospectively — what happened.  We make sense of experiences by looking 
backwards.  I call the dimension of the becoming-body that undertakes this 
mission the reflective-consciousness.  It brings affect into action in the world by 
transforming what is felt into deeds, words, and actions, purpose, and focus.  It is a 
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simultaneous translation:  such a delicate cooperation runs through affective and 
reflective-consciousness that one is always holding some power over the other.  The 
power of affecting and being affected binds them together.15  Reflective-
consciousness is always looking for focus.  However, in experience, there is too 
much affective information, no linearity at all, and mandatory heterogeneousness.  
How do we make sense of that?  We get a grip onto the emergent singularity, which 
we grasp in the form of aesthetic qualities that together convey a single affective 
tone.   
What is the affective tone being played by the becoming-body-instrument?  
In the same way different sounds rhythmically organize themselves through the 
composition of a harmony, as Bergson notes, experience’s affective becoming 
gathers the situation’s real potentiality into one single affective tone:  a felt 
aesthetic quality.16  Forged by relationality through an activity of co-creation 
between the becoming-body and its environment, the Flow is animated by its own 
becoming-affective tonality.  This is the being of relation; it is the real subject of the 
Sea-event.  How may we describe a harmony?  The same difficulty applies to felt 
experience.  Although we might attempt to describe the Sea-Event as a “soothing 
sensation,” words cannot convey the complexity of a feeling.    
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ABSTRACT 
This essay derives its focus on poetry from the subtitle of Die Fröhliche Wissenshaft: “la gaya scienza.”  
Nietzsche appropriated this phrase from the phrase “gai saber” used by the Provençal knight-poets 
(or troubadours) of the eleventh through thirteenth centuries — the first lyric poets of the 
European languages — to designate their Ars Poetica or “art of poetry.”  I will begin with an 
exploration of Nietzsche’s treatment of poets and poetry as a subject matter, closely analyzing his 
six aphorisms which deal explicitly with poets and poetry.  Having considered The Gay Science as 
a text about poetry, I will then briefly explore three further ways in which The Gay Science can be 
thought of as itself a kind of poetry.  The result of these analyses is an understanding of 
Nietzsche’s own understanding of philosophy (and of the best way to live) as also a form of 
poetry.   
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Tell all the Truth but tell it slant – 
Success in Circuit lies 
Too bright for our infirm Delight 
The Truth’s superb surprise 
 -Emily Dickinson (ca. 1868)1
 
 
 
  
I. The Gay Science on Poetry 
 
There are six aphorisms in The Gay Science that are centrally concerned with 
poetry as such:  three in Book Two, one in Book Three, and two in Book Four.  I 
will consider them in the order in which they appear in the text, building a 
cumulative sense of Nietzsche’s understanding of poetry and thereby of his 
own Ars Poetica.  I will begin with three aphorisms that investigate the 
sources of (1) the poet’s power, (2) poetry itself, and (3) the phenomenon of 
“prose” as a kind of calcified poetry.  From the beginning, one can see that 
poetry is not, for Nietzsche as opposed to Heidegger, some omnipotent, 
metaphysical force filled with gravitas.2  Instead, poetry for Nietzsche is 
essentially incomplete, it traffics in the fantasy world of magic, and it is not 
above masking itself as its apparent other — prose. 
 Aphorism 79 argues that the source of poets’ power and appeal lies in 
their forever approaching their goals without achieving them.  “Indeed, [the 
poet] owes his advantages and fame much more to his ultimate incapacity 
than to his ample strength [Kraft].”  Nietzsche writes of the poet’s “foretaste” 
of a “vision” which is never wholly captured, and which by that very fact 
inspires such powerful cravings in the poet that it even spreads contagiously 
to the poet’s listeners, and “lifts [them] above [the poet’s] work and all mere 
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‘works’ and lends them wings to soar as high as listeners had never soared.”  
The eros or Lust for the poet’s ever-unfulfilled vision thus erotically 
transforms the listeners “into poets and seers” themselves.  The expanding 
range of the concept of poet in this radical democratization, though it is 
seemingly anathema to Nietzsche’s aristocratic sensibilities, also prefigures 
his later discussion of a kind of poetry of life, living one’s life as a form of 
poetry, to which I will return below. 
This interplay of erotic forces also suggests the eros of the Platonic 
dialogues, particularly the Ion, in which Socrates describes the young Ion’s 
tremendous yet comical power over those who experience his recitations of 
Homer.  As Socrates puts it to Ion, “this is not an art in you whereby you speak 
well on Homer, but a divine power, which moves like the stone which 
Euripedes named a magnet.” 3  As for the comical dimension, during this 
divine inspiration, the poet “has been put out of his senses, and his mind is 
no longer in him.” 4  Given Nietzsche’s love of philology and the ancient 
Greeks, it would be surprising if he did not have this connection to Ion as the 
comically inarticulate poetic performer in mind. 
 Aphorism 84 builds on Nietzsche’s understanding of the poet as 
master of potentiality, with its central thesis that the Ursprung of poetry — its 
origin or “upspring” as in Heidegger’s Ursprung des Kunstwerkes — lies in “the 
magical song and the spell.”  In German, aphorism 84 reads as follows:  
Zauberlied und Besprechung scheinen die Urgestalt der Poesie zu sein.  “Magic-song 
and incantation shines the originary-form of poetry to be.”  Against the 
popular conception of poetry as currently useless and therefore useless in its 
origins, Nietzsche asserts that, on the contrary, poetry had originally “a very 
great utility,” a utility that was “superstitious” or “mythological” 
[abergläubische].   
He explains that in ancient times, the awareness of rhythm as a 
mnemonic device for human beings was generalized to the belief that 
rhythm affected the gods in the same way, and that a “rhythmical prayer was 
supposed to get closer to the ears of the gods.”  In short, rhythm was seen as a 
way to exert power and control over even the gods in what contemporary 
Westerners would characterize as a silly, superstitious way.  “[M]an warf ihnen 
die Poesie wie eine magische Schlinge um:  One threw, at the gods, poetry like a 
magical lasso.”   
It is also interesting that Nietzsche in the preceding quote 
characterizes rhythm, the chief music of poetry, as a compulsion (Zwang):  
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the same word he uses to describe “every morality” in Beyond Good and Evil, in 
which he links moral compulsion to “the metrical compulsion [Zwang] of 
rhyme and rhythm.” 5  Thus, both morality and poetry according to Nietzsche 
have a “compulsive” power, and in both cases this compulsion is linked to 
religion.  For poetry this link to religion is explicit, as poetry is the lasso that 
pulls the gods.  And as for morality, Nietzsche attributes what he terms “slave 
morality” to the priestly class of the Jewish people, the central aspect of 
whose faith is the sacred text (especially the Torah).  Put differently, poetry in 
general for Nietzsche (like the Jewish poetry of the Tanakh) is a tool through 
which the priest can compel the people with their preferred new morality. 
The poet from aphorism 79 can thus be thought of as a sort of priest or 
mountebank, hawking a truth that is always deferred and delivered in the 
compulsion of the music of language.  The poet is part of the same priestly 
lineage from which, according to the third essay in On the Genealogy of Morals, 
the philosopher is born.6 
 To resume my reading of aphorism 84 of The Gay Science, and return 
from the specific issue of religious magic to magic in general:  Nietzsche also 
distinguishes “an even stranger notion that may have contributed most of all 
to the origin of poetry” — “the power of discharging the emotions, of 
purifying the soul… precisely by means of rhythm.”  Nietzsche seems to be 
speaking here of the famous catharsis of Aristotle’s Poetics.  “[O]ne sought to 
push the exuberance and giddiness of the emotions to an extreme … a 
tranquilizer, not because it is tranquil itself, but because its aftereffects make 
one tranquil.”  Nietzsche also stresses the everyday utility of poetry as 
incantation or spell:  “Every action provides an occasion for song: every action 
depends on the assistance of spirits.”  In other words, poetry is 
simultaneously ordinary and divine, since every action is worthy of song, 
every song is composed of lyrics (that is, lyric poetry), and every action 
requires divine assistance.  With regard to the larger issue of poetry’s origins, 
the point is that something which now strikes us as banal nevertheless 
began as divine — because the everyday for the ancient Greeks was itself a 
magical thing.  Put differently, we undervalue poetry because we 
underestimate the magic of the ordinary. 
 Nietzsche concludes aphorism 84 by discussing the role of poetry in 
prophecy.  He claims that prophecy meant originally, etymologically, “to get 
something determined … to bind the future.”  The power of rhythm was 
believed to be so great that when wielded by Apollo, it could “bind even the 
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goddesses of fate”:  goddesses so strong that, in Homer, even Zeus is 
powerless to control them.  And remember here that Nietzsche was an 
atheist, and thus is not affirming prophecy as a legitimate and objectively 
rich faculty.  Instead, he is affirming it as a fictively creative power.  And that 
is the larger point of the entire aphorism.  To wit, Nietzsche is attempting to 
separate the form of poetry from specific religious content so that he can 
both practice and advocate redeploying the form with new and better 
content.  In other words, the Jewish priests used poetry to create gods, to 
compel their communities to live according to certain ethical values, but 
those values have outlived their purpose, and we have not yet learned to tap 
into that power of poetry in order to inspire present-day communities to live 
by new ethical values that will better promote flourishing today. 
 Aphorism 92 provides a greater clarification and expansion of 
Nietzsche’s concept of poetry by juxtaposing it with prose.  The aphorism 
begins: “It is noteworthy that the great masters of prose have almost always 
been poets, too … Good prose is only written face to face with poetry.”  Prose 
“is an uninterrupted war with poetry:  all of its attractions depend on the way 
in which poetry is continually avoided and contradicted.”  Just as it is often 
argued in the professional dance community that ballet is the foundational 
dance, one sees Nietzsche arguing that poetry is the fundamental linguistic 
art, the arche of writing.  In other words, anything other than poetry can only 
be written by, so to speak, turning poetry against itself, wresting the poetic 
away from poetry.  Westerners today tend to adopt a contrasting view in 
which poetry is augmented and ornamented prose.  But for Nietzsche, prose 
is fundamentally a stripped-down form of poetry, a poetry that negates most 
of its musicality and rhythm.  So when prose asserts its minimalist 
independence from poetry, that is really just poetry minimizing itself.  Poetry 
is thus a form of self-overcoming, while prose is one result or manifestation 
of that self-overcoming.  As with the employment of rhythm to coerce the 
Fates, prose is merely a tool capable of perhaps bending the will of poetry 
but never of fully overpowering it.   
All language for Nietzsche is fundamentally poetry although some 
poetry is so stripped down and minimal that it goes by another name, 
“prose.”  When one wants to accomplish certain goals — such as precision, 
clarity, or the appearance of scientific objectivity — it makes sense to write in 
the sub-genre of poetry that is prose.  Nietzsche elaborates:  
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Everything abstract wants to be read as a prank against poetry and as with a 
mocking voice; everything dry and cool is meant to drive the lovely goddess into 
despair.  Often there are rapprochements, reconciliations for a moment — and 
then a sudden leap back and laughter.  Often the curtain is raised and harsh light 
let in just as the goddess is enjoying her dusks and muted colors.  Often the 
words are taken out of her mouth and sung to a tune that drives her to cover her 
refined ears with her refined hands.  Thus there are thousands of delights in this 
war.7 
 
This is a remarkable passage for several reasons.  It constitutes a piece of 
prose that is performative of the very warfare it articulates between prose 
and poetry.  For Nietzsche, following Heraclitus, “War [thus, conflict, strife, 
opposition] is the father of all good things,” including “good prose.” 8   In the 
passage above, Nietzsche’s prose dances and flirts with poetic imagery and 
devices such as metaphor and personification as it laughingly describes the 
same process. 
However, there also seems to be a highly problematic, sadistic, sexual 
dimension to this passage.  Poetry is personified as a goddess, a woman with 
whom one toys.  One is cool towards her out of cruelty and then sadistically 
enjoys her ensuing despair.  One feigns agreeableness only to savor her pain 
when the agreeableness is withdrawn.  One steals her voice only to turn it 
against her painfully, all the while mocking her overly refined nature.  In a 
sense, in the middle of this warfare between poetry and prose, the prose 
warrior bursts into the poetic stronghold to violate the poetic enemy. 
 On another analysis, this passage may itself be read as poetry.  It is a 
poetry masquerading as prose that is locked in battle with poetry — and a 
poetry which laughs secretly at the reader for assuming that he or she is 
reading prose and assuming that the struggle between prose and poetry 
symbolized by the sexual imagery and language constitutes a sort of 
violation of poetry by prose — when in actuality, the entire scene is a fiction 
deployed by poetry for her own pleasure.   
 In order to corroborate the interpretation of aphorism 92 as poetry, I 
will now reproduce it in the original German in order to note a couple of 
poetic elements that were inevitably lost in translation: 
 
 
Jedes Abstraktum will als Schalkheit gegen diese und wie mit spöttischer 
Stimme vorgetragen sein; jede Trockenheit und Kühle soll die liebliche Göttin in 
eine liebliche Verzweifung bringen; oft gibt es Annäherungen, Versöhnungen 
des Augenblickes und dann ein plötzliches Zurückspringen und Auslachen; oft 
wird der Vorhang aufgezogen und grelles Licht hereingelassen, während gerade 
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die Göttin ihre Dämmerungen und dumpfen Farben genießt; oft wird ihr das 
Wort aus dem Munde genommen und nach einer Melodie abgesungen, bei der 
sie die feinen Hände vor die feinen Öhrchen hält, — und so gibt es tausend 
Vergnügungen des Krieges.9 
 
Note the alliteration of “s” sounds in the first clause and “k” sounds in the 
second clause as well as Nietzsche’s use of repetition (for example, of the 
word “liebliche” in the second clause.)  Note also the rolling cadence of the 
third clause, primarily established by the falling metrical pattern of the 
words:  the first syllable is stressed, and the last syllables are not — as in 
“Aus-lach-en” and “plötz-lich-es.” 
 In reviewing aphorism 92, one might conclude that Nietzsche 
presents poetry as the true arche of prose in the dual sense of origin or source 
and of governing principle or ruling trajectory.  Nietzsche thereby 
problematizes the general distinction between poetry and prose, and the 
distinction between poetry and philosophy qua argumentative prose that is 
evident in his own writing.  Is all philosophy simply poetry that to some 
extent resists its own “poeticity”? 
 Poetry, construed as the arche of prose, is thus strongly implicated in 
the lineage of philosophy.  At least in Nietzsche’s work, quoted above, 
philosophy demonstrates itself a rightful inheritor of the characteristics of 
poetry elaborated in aphorisms 79 and 84 above.  The philosopher manifests 
as the unwitting carrier of the traits of the seductive, ever-seeking, ever-
unfinished visionary, working in a linguistic medium born as magic and 
spells.  What is more, if we attend to the history of this marginalized origin of 
philosophy in poetry, the memories of these spells can be restored to the 
philosopher, and the traits show themselves as a visible phenotype.  In other 
words, the philosopher can become a poet.  The benefit of this 
transformation is the ability to create worlds that do not forget their creative 
origins, which origins imply that we can and perhaps ought to laugh at 
“those creations,” rather than force those creations on others in the guise of 
absolute truth. 
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II. The Gay Science as Problematizing of  
the Poet and Poetry 
 
Having developed a general picture of the poet and poetry for Nietzsche, I 
now turn to the last three aphorisms on poetry in The Gay Science, which 
further explore the nature of the poet in ways that liberate the figure of the 
poet from both (1) a religiously-informed portrayal as medium of 
transcendent truth and (2) a narrow conceptualization as one who simply 
writes poems as instances of a literary genre.  Beginning with (1), Nietzsche’s 
most condensed statement of what makes poets unfit to serve as 
mouthpieces for transcendent truth appears in aphorism 222:  “Poet and liar 
[Dichter und Lügner]:  the poet considers the liar a foster brother [Milchbruder:  
literally, ‘milk brother,’ nursed by the same woman] whose milk the poet has 
drunk; so it is that the liar remains wretched and has not once attained a 
good conscience.”  The title of the aphorism, in which the names of the two 
figures constitute a half-rhyme or slant rhyme, adds literary potency to their 
discursive identification in the sentence that follows.  Not only is the poet a 
liar, but his or her name also partially rhymes with the word “liar.”   
One may consider the privation of the poet as a privation insofar as 
lying is considered a privation of the truth.  In formal logic, the presence of 
even one embedded negation or privation in an argument alters its 
conclusion.  According to my descriptions of Nietzsche’s other aphorisms 
above, the poet emerges as a more original form of the philosopher.  The 
philosopher is thus as — an amnesiac-rebellious poet — indirectly 
condemned as essentially a liar as well. 
 It is not entirely surprising that Nietzsche should describe the poet 
as a liar, since in aphorism 79 he describes the poet as a visionary who lures 
others with the deception that his or her vision will eventually be realized.  
And in aphorism 84, he describes poetry as originating from incantations 
and other obscure occult practices, which certainly do not ring with 
connotations of truth to ears accustomed to scientific materialism.  
Furthermore, aphorism 84 ends with the following Homeric quote:  “Many 
lies tell the poets.”  And in aphorism 92, poetry was also described as 
deceptive insofar as it often parades in a deformed disguise calling itself 
prose. 
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But in aphorism 222, this deceptive nature is made much more 
explicit to the extent that the poet drinks the same milk as the common liar 
but is only half-brother to the liar.  The only significant difference between 
the two figures is that the poet achieves power and dubious renown while 
the liar remains despised.  One assumes that the source of poetry’s better 
fortune lies in its magical-musical aspects since only those who lie in prose 
are persecuted while their lyrically-inclined relatives prosper under a 
different name. 
 As a result of this essential deceptiveness, Nietzsche’s poets 
doubtlessly prove themselves unworthy of the mantle of absolute truth and 
equally deserving of their exile from communities that hold absolute truth 
most precious, such as the allegedly ideal “city in speech” in Plato’s Republic.10  
But this unworthiness with regard to Truth also allows Nietzsche to praise 
the poets for their considerable power and charm without fear of elevating 
the poets to the level of new transcendent idols.   
By naming the poet as liar, Nietzsche as himself a lying poet 
performs a self-overcoming of lying as it has been understood in Western 
culture.  The lie in its role as the poet’s instrument begins to absorb the 
magical quality and beautiful seductive music that formerly belonged only 
to poetry.  Nietzsche is in effect assisting the poet’s milk-brother in finally 
getting his fair share of the milk, becoming healthy and strong and attaining 
a good conscience — all of which seems appropriate, given that the will to lie 
and the will to poetry for Nietzsche are but two names for the same drive, 
the same will to power. 
This radical homogenization of deception and poetry has various 
implications both inside and outside of poetry as literary genre.  In the 
context of poetry’s sharing its powers and positive status with its formerly 
unacknowledged relatives, consider The Gay Science’s oft-quoted aphorism 
299: 
 
What one should learn from artists. —  How can we make things beautiful, 
attractive, and desirable for us when they are not?  And I rather think that in 
themselves they never are.  Here we could learn something from physicians, 
when for example they dilute what is bitter or add wine and sugar to a mixture 
— but even more from artists who are really continually trying to bring off such 
inventions and feats.  Moving away from things until there is a good deal that 
one no longer sees and there is much that our eye has to add if we are still to see 
them at all; or seeing things around a corner and as cut out or framed; or to place 
them so that they partially conceal each other and grant us only glimpses of 
architectural perspectives; or looking at them through tinted glass or in the light 
of sunset; or giving them a surface and skin that is not fully transparent — all 
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this we should learn from artists while being wiser than they are in other 
matters.  For with them this subtle power usually comes to an end where art ends and 
life begins; but we want to be the poets of our life — first of all in the smallest most 
everyday matters.11 
  
This entire passage, too, is remarkable and merits careful consideration.  
First, Nietzsche remarks that he thinks life is never beautiful, attractive, or 
desirable in itself.  If Nietzsche took metaphysical claims to the realities of 
things “in themselves” seriously, this would indeed be a very dark sentiment.  
But for Nietzsche there is always the issue of all-too-human perspectives 
that necessarily rule out the possibility of a divine perspective for human 
beings.  That is, by his own reasoning, Nietzsche can only be making this 
claim, whether genuinely or ironically, from one particular embodied 
perspective.  Either he is serious, but it is just one person speaking from one 
position at one moment in history.  Or he is disingenuous.  But in neither case 
is this the timeless, absolute, “God’s honest” truth about human life.
 Second, Nietzsche in a certain way equates the physician’s work and 
the artist’s work.  Both kinds of work pursue a similar goal, namely making 
the undesirable world appear desirable, and even their methods are 
somewhat similar.  The physician, however, acts to  shift the perception of the 
patient in a way that is unconscious for the patient (for example by helping a 
diabetic patient regulate her/his insulin levels, part of the benefit of which is 
more stable mood, as hypoglycemia can cause distressing feelings).  By 
contrast, the artist works to consciously shift the viewer’s perceptions.  A 
more important distinguishing factor than medium, however, appears to be 
the intensity or obsessive duration of the artist’s efforts, insofar as the artist 
is “really continually trying” to make the world appear beautiful.  Since artists 
are trying to do so all the time and thus have plenty of experience, Nietzsche 
seems to suggest that we see what can be learned from their efforts. 
 The reader is then instructed to learn the following specific things:  
(1) to create distance between oneself and a thing until one is forced to create 
parts of the thing that one can no longer perceive in order to perceive the 
thing at all — as in the literary criticism of ancient texts for example; (2) to 
adopt an unusual perspective (which is typically considered inferior) on 
something — as in free-wheeling scientific experimentation; (3) to artificially 
frame a thing or put it in a different context; (4) to arrange things in such a 
way that each one obscures one’s view of the others; (5) to examine things 
through tinted glass or inferior media; (6) to examine things at unusual 
times; and (7) to intentionally obscure an otherwise clear view of something 
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— all of which are possible descriptions of intentional, repressive, active 
forgetting. 
 These paraphrases and examples as well of course are merely 
possible interpretations — and similarly untrustworthy ones — of the will to 
knowledge that is always already the will “to ignorance, to the uncertain, to 
the untrue!” 12  However, according to Nietzsche we wish to go beyond the 
instructive example of the artist.  And to do so requires that we liberate this 
deceptive practice of the artist from the confines of art and extend it to every 
other practice in our world, to the very living of our lives.  “Wir aber wollen die 
Dichter unseres Lebens sein, und im Kleinsten und Alltäglichsten zuerst! —  We, 
however, wish the poets of our lives to be, and in that which is smallest and 
most everyday, first.”  It seems this would entail the joyful celebration of 
perspectives and the carefree utilization of deception where necessary in our 
lives.  In the light of the previous aphorisms, we wish to be the visionaries 
who hunger perennially for visions never fully realized in a language born as 
poetry, born as magical spells, fighting a constant war to return our prose to 
poetry, the joyful deceived-deceivers, the “tempting-attempting 
experimenters [Versucher].” 13  
 One might wonder, however, what would stop the inevitable collapse 
of society consequent upon everyone’s beginning to lie without constraint or 
inhibition.  The answer lies in the very specific audience for whom 
Nietzsche’s challenge was intended.  He writes of what “one” should learn 
from artists and of the “we” who wish to be the poets of our lives.  But who 
exactly are these people?  Did they even exist for Nietzsche when he 
composed these lines?  If not, do they exist now?  The final aphorism I will 
consider, 301, should prove helpful in this context. 
 This aphorism treats of the “higher human beings” who “see and hear 
immeasurably more, and see and hear thoughtfully.”  But this type of higher 
human being, according to Nietzsche, “can never shake off a delusion … He 
calls his own nature contemplative and overlooks that er selbst auch der 
eigentliche Dichter und Fortdichter des Lebens ist [that he himself, also, the actual 
poet and ever-poet of life is].” 14  In this passage, appearing only two 
aphorisms after the one just considered, one finds that it is the higher 
human beings, the contemplatives, the free spirits, who are not merely being 
encouraged to expand the will to untruth from art to life but rather already 
doing so: 
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As a poet, he has … above all vis creativa, which the active human being lacks … 
We [higher people] who think and feel at the same time are those who really 
continually fashion something that had not been there before:  the whole 
eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, 
affirmations, and negations.  This poem that we have invented is continually 
studied by the so-called practical human beings (our actors) who learn their 
roles and translate everything into flesh and actuality, into the everyday.15  
 
Thus, the higher persons in their continual acts of poetic creation actually 
create the world of meaning, signification, and value that all human beings 
inhabit.  Nietzsche is never clear, however, as to whom he has in mind with 
the term “higher persons” — though it seems likely to include scientists and 
philosophers who are especially creative in their work.  The deceptive aspect 
of the poetic impulse applied to life in general by the higher human beings 
to whom Nietzsche’s above exhortations are addressed is thus not used 
primarily as a license to be destructive of society and the world but as the 
power to create ever new worlds.  Nietzsche seems to loosely define a world 
as a collection of objects organized, evaluated, and created according to a 
particular set of standards.  And each of those worlds in its broadest sense is 
a poem.16   
One implication of this view is that adding an ordinary object like a 
new pair of shoes creates a new world.  Though this might initially seem 
counterintuitive, consider the famous scene from the film adaptation of the 
Grapes of Wrath in which a young boy lights up with the joy of a new world 
when he receives a pair of new shoes.  Or take the case of Che Guevara’s 
classic text Guerrilla Warfare.  Guevara mentions shoes no less than twelve 
times in that slim volume, claiming that they are the most important tool in 
the guerilla fighters’ attempt to bring a post-revolutionary world into being.17  
And few things are more poetic than a revolution. 
I will conclude my exploration of these aphorisms by presenting the 
rest of the passage quoted above, the meaning of which seems relatively 
clear: 
 
Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to 
its nature — nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, 
as a present — and it was we who gave and bestowed it.  Only we have created 
the world that concerns man!  — But precisely this knowledge we lack, and when 
we occasionally catch it for a fleeting moment we forget it again immediately; 
we fail to recognize our best power and underestimate ourselves, the 
contemplatives, just a little.  We are neither as proud nor as happy as we might be.18 
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III. The Gay Science as Poetry 
 
I have already considered two ways in which, according to Nietzsche, The Gay 
Science itself constitutes a type of poetry.  First, from the poetry/prose warfare 
described in aphorism 92, I observed that all prose is merely a kind of 
calcified poetry, constantly fighting its own poetic tendencies.  Thus, The Gay 
Science, just like all prose, can be considered partially de-formed poetry.  
Moreover, The Gay Science would not be Nietzsche’s only prose poem as he 
also composed the epic, ironic prose poem that is Thus Spoke Zarathustra.19 
Second, I noted at the beginning of this essay Nietzsche’s allusion to 
the troubadours’ art of poetry, gai saber, in the subtitle of The Gay Science.  It is 
a widespread tradition for poets in the West to compose a poem entitled “Ars 
Poetica” in which they describe their particular way of writing poetry, which is 
itself in the form of a poem (including those by Archibald MacLeish and 
Timothy Liu).  There are also, incidentally, many other poems that serve the 
same function without the official title, such as Marianne Moore’s “Poetry.”20  
The phrase “Ars Poetica” comes from the Roman poet Horace’s treatise of the 
same name  The contents and styles of these “Ars Poetica” poems vary 
enormously, as one might expect, from one type of poet to another.  
Compare for example these lines from Archibald MacLeish’s contribution: 
 
A poem should be motionless in time 
As the moon climbs.21 
 
to these lines from contemporary American poet Timothy Liu’s effort: 
 
Childhood begins with your first good line —  
a spider waiting for its kill.22 
 
Given the subtitle of the second edition ofThe Gay Science:  with a Prelude in 
Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, which suggests that the book’s “prose” 
content is surrounded at both ends by a group of individual poems, perhaps 
it would be fruitful to think of The Gay Science as itself an Ars Poetica and 
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therefore as a poem that both enacts and describes the art of poetry as the 
poet understands it.  Moreover, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche describes 
the troubadours as “magnificent and inventive human beings… to whom 
Europe owes so many things and almost owes itself.” 23  The significance that 
Nietzsche attaches to these knight-poets seems to further support my 
conception of The Gay Science as poetry.  Recall that the title of the book is a 
German translation (Die Fröliche Wissenshaft) of the Latin phrase the 
troubadours used for their art of poetry.  Finally, The Gay Science fits 
Nietzsche’s broad conception of poetry as revealed in the above six 
aphorisms. 
At any rate, these two groups of poems at the beginning and end of 
The Gay Science, particularly in their playful spirit, can be understood as 
forming a poetic boundary which is at the same time a sort of un-bounding 
insofar as it attacks seriousness and serious attempts to contain or achieve 
certainty in knowledge and thereby to contain life itself.  Instead, one is free 
to willfully create knowledge for one’s time in the service of life.   
Consider for example poem 9 from the opening poems, entitled “My 
Roses”: 
 
Yes, joy wants to amuse, 
Every joy wants to amuse. 
Would you like to pick my roses? 
 
You must stoop and stick your noses 
Between thorns and rocky views, 
And not be afraid of bruises. 
 
For my joy — enjoys good teases. 
For my joy — enjoys good ruses. 
Would you like to pick my roses? 24 
 
One would be at a loss here if searching for the kind of clarity and order 
which have long been demanded of philosophical texts by some 
philosophical traditions (sometimes at the cost of the clear thing being 
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pointless, the order stultifying and rigid).  A Western reader encounters the 
phrases “my love is like a rose” and “the soul is a simple substance” with very 
different expectations, allowing possibilities to multiply in the case of the 
former while trying to nail down the timelessly transcendent truth of the 
latter.  Against this bifurcation into serious philosophy and silly poetry, 
Nietzsche offers a prelude and appendix of poems to a philosophical text 
and thereby questions the assumption that poetry and philosophy must be 
interpreted differently. 
In other words, in the face of what Nietzsche might describe as 
“Socratic” attempts to “cage Dionysus,” the “prelude of rhymes” and “appendix 
of songs” can be thought of as rebellious, wicked guards that are always 
flinging open the gates of the cage.  The prelude and appendix are 
nevertheless limits to the “prose” aphoristic center of the text, delimiting 
where the “book” begins and ends.  But since poetry for Nietzsche is self-
mocking, as I have attempted to show in this essay, the prelude and appendix 
also simultaneously un-limit the limits that they embody, loosening and 
unbinding the prose text, which thereby acquires the semblance of poetic 
freedom.  The conventional poetry of the prelude and appendix can be read 
as a reminder to the reader of the light-hearted, subversive, poetic quality of 
the entire text of The Gay Science.  The prelude and appendix of The Gay Science 
are not its only instances of poetic unlimiting limits.  That which the prelude 
and appendix encircle, namely the aphorisms themselves, also resonate with 
poetic unbounding boundaries.  Of particular relevance to this issue is the 
etymology of the word “aphorism.”  The word is derived from the Greek root 
horizein, from which is derived the English word horizon.  As a verb, horizein 
means to bound, to limit, to mark; and in mathematical discourses, a true 
horizon is one in which one’s visibility is unobstructed in all directions, 
resulting in a perfectly circular perspective.  However, the limits enacted by 
even a true horizon are radically perspectival, and with even the slightest 
change of location, the observer finds her/himself no longer bound to those 
limits.  Thus, a horizon should be understood not as an absolute limit but as 
a limit on what can be seen from a given point of view over one period of 
time. 
One could in this light conceive of Nietzsche’s aphorisms as a 
network of these various, circular true horizons, which a reader can overlap 
like seismographic readings to create more complex, subtle, and perhaps 
even accurate “readings” or results.  Furthermore, the true horizon in its 
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circular nature can be articulated theoretically as the result of bending or 
slanting a perfectly straight line.  All but parallel straight lines intersect at 
some point, so even the slightest slant on a line — or a truth — entails 
convergence, intersection, and the likelihood of circularity. As to why 
Nietzsche might have chosen to write this book aphoristically, one likely 
possibility is that most lyric poetry is short, and as a prose poem about 
poetry, it is fitting for The Gay Science to contain a significant number of lyric 
poem-sized sections.  Poetry, as “slanted truths,” as problematic and often 
circular lines of language and thought, can thus be thought of as the “true 
horizon” of language and thought.  As Emily Dickinson reminds us, “Success 
in circuit lies.” 
 
IV. Conclusion:  Slanted Truths 
 
 In light of the above explorations, it seems that the best way of 
characterizing poetry, broadly construed, would be as slanted truths.  
Slanted truths, meaning a plurality of truths attacked and constructed from 
different angles, always from an embedded, embodied perspective and 
always strategically.  Truth slanted — to summarize my above analyses of the 
six aphorisms from The Gay Science — by the tempests of a vision that must 
always be pursued, slanted by the forces of magical incantations, by the 
glancing blows of the perpetual civil war of poetry expressed as prose, 
slanted by the power of creativity.  And especially by the creation of the 
“higher persons” of their ever-evolving cumulative poems, which we call the 
world.  
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ABSTRACT 
This paper delineates the idea of postmodern music as it is found in the writings of 
Jean-François Lyotard.  Lyotard’s concept of the postmodern in general has informed 
debates about what “postmodern music” might be, but his own writings on music 
have not been given their due weight in such debates. While he never defines such a 
concept explicitly in his writings, it may be extrapolated from them.  In the essay 
“Music and Postmodernity,” he draws an analogy between the liberation of humanity 
in socio-political modernity and the liberation of sonic material in musical modernity.  
While Lyotard does not quite make this explicit, the implication is that for him, an 
event analogous to the well-known “end of metanarratives” which signals the 
transition to postmodernity is evident in the history of music.  Just as the 
development of the Enlightenment project has resulted in a breakdown of the 
narratives of the emancipation of humanity, so too the successful liberation of sound 
in musical modernity has led to the explosion of a coherent narrative of musical 
“progress,” instituting something like a musical postmodernity.  Instead of any idea of 
general eclecticism following from this, however, Lyotard is clear about the stakes of 
postmodern music (as of all art):  those stakes concern the aesthetic of the sublime 
and mean searching for “the inaudible” in the audible through any and all means of 
experimentation on sonorous matter.  The upshot is that while Lyotard endorses a 
kind of heterogeneity in his approach to postmodern music, he denies the loss of all 
critical stakes which is often thought to attend such a position. 
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Our ears are deaf to what sound can do.  We must give back to the 
act of listening the power to open itself to the inaudible. 
                                                                                  — Lyotard1
1 
  
 
As in other areas, the term “postmodern” has been used in musicology to 
mean a variety of different things:  the music of a particular historical period, 
the end of experimentation and return to traditional forms of composition, a 
pastiche of old styles, a breakdown of the distinction between “elite” and 
“popular” musics, a concern with the politics of marginalized identities, and 
so on.2  One of the mostly widely accredited authorities on the meaning of 
the postmodern is Jean-François Lyotard, whose characterization of the 
postmodern as an “incredulity toward metanarratives” has often been 
invoked in discussions around postmodern music.3  Lyotard was something 
of an amateur musicologist and devoted at least six essays solely to music in 
addition to numerous scattered remarks on the topic throughout his prolific 
writings.4  However, remarkably, only Lyotard’s general theory of the 
postmodern — principally as it is found in his book The Postmodern Condition 
and not his own writings on music — has significantly informed debates 
about the meaning of postmodern music.  
My aim here is to rectify this by clarifying what “postmodern music” 
would mean for Lyotard.  It is possible that his idea of postmodern music has 
not been more widely acknowledged because he never uses the term 
“postmodern music” or makes explicit what such a term might mean within 
his philosophical perspective.  The question is clearly raised in his essay “The 
Inaudible:  Music and Postmodernity,” but even there an explicit answer is 
not forthcoming.  However, as I shall argue here, it is possible to reconstruct 
what postmodern music would mean for Lyotard by “joining the dots” 
between a number of his essays on music and general aesthetics.  As we shall 
see, for Lyotard the meaning of postmodern music may be intimately linked 
with an aesthetic of the sublime.   
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Let me begin with two brief methodological points which guide my reading 
of Lyotard’s aesthetics, including his writings on music.  First, while Lyotard is 
frequently characterized as a post-structuralist philosopher, when it comes 
to aesthetics, it is better to think of him as a “post-phenomenologist.”  By this 
I do not refer to the North American school of phenomenology represented 
by philosophers such as Don Ihde in association with whom the term “post-
phenomenology” has also been used.5  Rather, I mean to designate the way in 
which Lyotard takes up themes and concerns from the phenomenological 
tradition but develops them beyond the scope of that tradition in a manner 
similar to those of other roughly contemporaneous French philosophers:  
Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, or Jean-Luc Marion for example might also 
be described as post-phenomenologists.  Lyotard’s rich and diverse aesthetic 
concerns inscribe an arc which begins and ends in a critical encounter with 
Merleau-Ponty, especially the celebrated essay “Eye and Mind.”6  More 
significantly, the “unpresentable” that Lyotard consistently identified as 
being at stake in the arts may be approached via phenomenology but not 
elaborated by it since by definition the unpresentable does not appear 
phenomenally.7  In this sense Lyotard’s aesthetics pushes phenomenology to 
a point where it ceases to be phenomenology.  Yet in a way this is simply the 
exercise and elaboration of a paradox inherent in phenomenology from the 
start.  Since Husserl, phenomenology was never really content to describe 
appearances but sought through a kind of transcendental reasoning to 
identify the conditions of possibility for such appearing:  consciousness in 
Husserl, Being in Heidegger, the flesh in Merleau-Ponty, life in Henry, etc.  
Typically, the conditions of the given are posited as not themselves being 
given.  Thus Lyotard distinguishes in a work of art the given presentation — 
that which appears, which makes itself known to perception and thought — 
and the unpresentable, the elusive condition that enables what is presented to 
be art rather than an object of knowledge and to give rise to an aesthetic 
response.  In music, as we shall see, this means — and I quote Lyotard —  that 
“what is at stake in musical pieces that merit the name of opuses [is] the 
enigma of letting appear, of letting be heard” and that “[w]hat is audible in 
the opus is musical only in as much as it evokes the inaudible.”8  
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Second, my reading is guided by what I would like to call “Lyotard’s 
doubt.”  This terminology is inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s well-known essay, 
“Cézanne’s Doubt,” and Lyotard’s elaboration of this theme in his essay, 
“Freud According to Cézanne.” 9  Grosso modo:  Cézanne’s continually shifting 
style through at least four “periods” may be explained by his doubt that there 
is any style which can adequately render the visual in painting.10  Lyotard’s 
aesthetics also seems to have its “periods”:  most notably an earlier Freudian 
“libidinal” period and a later Kantian “sublime” period.  Like Cézanne’s 
amorphous styles, Lyotard’s shifting philosophical approaches may be 
understood as motivated by his doubt that any philosophy can adequately 
render the kinds of issues he seeks to think, including questions about music 
or art in general.  This methodological point helps us to understand an 
aspect of Lyotard’s work which is otherwise in danger of causing confusion 
and frustration.  Not only do Lyotard’s philosophical approaches change 
throughout his career  — e.g., from Freud to Kant as a primary point of 
reference — but the value accorded to terms shifts as well.  Each of Lyotard’s 
terms is of course complex, but it seems that within each of his philosophical 
periods, certain terms indicate presentation while others indicate the 
unpresentable.  What can seem disconcerting is that as Lyotard’s thought 
develops, terms previously indicating the unpresentable move over to the 
side of presentation while new terms are summoned for the unpresentable.  
For example, after Discourse, Figure, “figure” begins to refer to discourse or 
structure; and while “desire” is the term exploited for its indeterminacy in 
Lyotard’s work of the 1960s and 1970s, by the 1980s it is rendered in terms of 
“intrigue” in opposition to unpresentable “presence.” 11 What this indicates is 
simply that, according to Lyotard, no term can adequately render “the 
unpresentable” — as soon as it is described and thought, it is too “presented,” 
and something less familiar must then be introduced to indicate the 
unpresentable.  With these methodological points in mind, let me turn to 
the elaboration of Lyotard’s philosophical reflections on postmodern music.  
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Lyotard inscribes the stakes of a musical aesthetics into the problematic of 
modernity and postmodernity in the essay “The Inaudible:  Music and 
Postmodernity,” written in 1991.  The argument proceeds by way of an 
analogy.  Lyotard reiterates his well-known thesis on postmodernity as the 
“end of grand narratives,” then asks whether we may consider something 
analogous to this event to have occurred in music.  Lyotard defines the 
modern as the period marked by the credibility of a philosophy of history — 
called a “grand narrative” or “metanarrative” — which posits the progressive 
emancipation of humanity as its goal.  In this sense, the postmodern marks the 
loss of credence given to this idea of historical progress.  According to 
Lyotard, the legitimation of projects has largely ceased to appeal to the 
progress of human freedom.  Instead, in the contemporary developed world, 
projects are seen as legitimate when they manifest an increase in the 
efficiency of the capitalist, technoscientific “system.”  This increase in 
efficiency is the only good now recognized, and the multiple ideologies of 
“progress” have been supplanted by an ideology of “development.”  “The 
postmodern condition,” Lyotard writes, “is that of human beings when they 
are caught in this process, which simultaneously develops their powers and 
demands their enslavement.” 12 
Lyotard draws an analogy with music by suggesting that “[t]he 
history of western music may be thought of globally as the emancipation of 
sound.” 13  He takes his bearings here from Theodor W. Adorno’s Philosophy of 
New Music, where the latter writes that “with the liberation of the material, 
the possibility of mastering it has increased.” 14  Lyotard’s suggestion is that 
all experiments and innovations in the history of western music have 
questioned the necessity of the rules which thus far have governed the ways 
in which sounds are selected, manipulated, and composed in order to be 
considered music within that tradition.  Such rules include the principles of 
pitch, timbre, rhythm, melody, harmony, and so on.  But experimentation 
reveals that such rules are conventional and contingent, and the only 
necessity of music is its material:  sound or sonorous matter, “the vibration of 
the air with its components, frequency, duration, amplitude, color, and 
attack.” 15  With this observation, Lyotard suggests that scientific research on 
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sound — as in acoustics and psychophysiology — may converge with new 
technological means of treating and synthesizing sound and the rule-
breaking experiments of composers and musicians to liberate sound from 
the conventions of musical tradition and multiply its possibilities.16  
While Lyotard does not explicitly specify as such, it is easy to see that 
this story would be a modern way of understanding music:  the grand 
narrative of “western art music” as the emancipation of sound.  As Derek 
Scott explains, musical modernism frequently subscribed to a teleological 
narrative of development:  “Modernists have continually seen works as 
‘pointing forwards’ to others, thus reinforcing a sense of self-determining 
progress in the arts … the dominant grand narrative for musical modernism 
was that of the evolution and dissolution of tonality.” 17  What he has in mind 
here of course is the atonalism of Arnold Schönberg and his followers. 
Lyotard’s question then is whether we can speculate that there 
would be something analogous to the postmodern in music, an event which 
would call into question the credibility of this grand narrative of the 
liberation of sound.  He states that the question is a little naïve, and this is 
perhaps why he does not quite give it an explicit answer.  Yet the answer he 
implies is not too difficult to reconstruct, and this is what I will do in what 
follows.  In doing so, I will demonstrate how Lyotard’s reflections on the 
questions of musical modernity and postmodernity necessarily intersect 
with his reflections on the aesthetic of the sublime. 
 
4 
 
Lyotard stakes a claim for the predominant value of the aesthetic of the 
sublime in relation to the avant-garde arts in a series of essays published in 
the 1980s, and this aesthetic serves to clarify his understanding of the 
modern and postmodern in the arts.  His essays devoted to music from this 
period make little direct reference to the sublime, but music is included in 
the general aesthetics of the sublime he outlines elsewhere. 18,19  Lyotard 
argues that with the avant-gardes, the aesthetic of the beautiful can no 
longer be understood as illuminating the stakes of art.  Instead, such stakes 
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are linked with the aesthetic of the sublime.  Some of the main lines of 
reasoning he provides are as follows.  
First, he argues that avant-garde art departs from the aesthetic of the 
beautiful because the beautiful assumes a common taste shared by the 
public, which theoretically realizes itself in the feeling of pleasure universally 
produced in those who experience the work.  The sublime by contrast 
assumes no such “common sense” of taste.  The publics of avant-garde art 
“are prey to unforeseeable feelings:  they are shocked, admiring, scornful, 
indifferent.”20  What is at stake is no longer producing a shared feeling of 
pleasure in the members of the public but surprising them.21 
Second, Lyotard argues that  “sublime” is the most appropriate 
description of  indeterminacy, which was popular as an aesthetic technique 
among avant-garde artists.  These artists recognized that rule-following — 
which after Aristotle was called “poetics” — is not sufficient for the 
production or appreciation of aesthetic effects.  Lyotard writes: 
 
The predominance of the idea of techne placed works under a multiple 
regulation, that of the model taught in the studios, Schools and Academies, that 
of the taste shared by the aristocratic public, that of a purposiveness of art, 
which was to illustrate the glory of a name, divine or human, to which was linked 
the perfection of some cardinal virtue or other.  The idea of the sublime disrupts 
this harmony.22 
 
Third, Lyotard argues, the task of the avant-gardes after technical 
means of representing reality were perfected — namely by photography, 
film, and presumably also phonographic recording — is to present 
something other than what can be represented according to the traditional 
“rules” of representation.  He associates “the unpresentable” with the Idea in 
Kant:  a concept without an object which can be presented as an example.  
According to Kant’s aesthetics, we experience the sublime in aesthetic 
phenomena that suggest but cannot fully represent the Ideas of reason:  “the 
absolute” as such is just such an Idea for Kant.  Similarly, writes Lyotard, the 
task of the avant-gardes is to “present the unpresentable”:  in painting, the 
invisible in the visible; in music, the inaudible in the audible.  Lyotard insists 
that “[t]he sublime, and not the beautiful, is the sentiment called forth by 
these [avant-garde] works.”23 
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In particular, Lyotard associates this movement away from realistic 
representation with minimalism and abstraction.  According to him, 
artworks which come under these headings move away from a primary 
concern with form and towards a concern with matter.  (As will be discussed 
below, this is specified by a concern with color in painting and timbre in 
music.)  In Kantian aesthetics, the beautiful emphasizes the predominance 
of form as a shared basis of judgments of aesthetic taste while the sublime 
involves a crisis in the imagination’s ability to present forms.  The implication 
is that the experience of the sublime involves a kind of “formlessness.”  
Lyotard writes: 
 
As the idea of a natural fit between matter and form declines (a decline already 
implied in Kant’s analysis of the sublime … ) the aim for the arts, especially of 
painting and music, can only be that of approaching matter.  Which means 
approaching presence without recourse to the means of presentation.24 
 
Kant did not think that a work of art itself could be sublime, only 
represent sublime objects:  storms, mountains, and so on.  In extending his 
reinterpretation of Kant, Lyotard develops the notion of an immanent sublime 
in which the absolute or infinite is associated with matter in the work of art.  
In the work there is an “absolute” insofar as there is an indeterminate aspect 
of the work, not given by relations between elements — as “absolute” implies 
“without relation.”  In order to understand this appeal to an “absolute” as an 
absence of relations between elements, it is instructive to recall that 
Lyotard’s trajectory in aesthetics began with a critical rejection of 
structuralist aesthetics, which understands everything in terms of such 
relations.25  According to Lyotard, this absolute, this “matter,” is given by color 
in painting and timbre and nuance in music.  As he emphasizes in his 
writings on the painter Barnett Newman, the sublime is here, now:  it is the 
work itself in its materiality.26  This immanence of the sublime is what 
Lyotard emphasizes as the mark of postmodern art in his most well-known 
aesthetic distinction between the modern and the postmodern, made in the 
essay “Answering the Question:  What is the Postmodern?”.  The modern is 
sublime but nostalgic; it presents the fact that there is an absent, 
transcendent absolute.  But the postmodern gives an immanent absolute; it 
presents the unpresentable in the work itself.27  The differences between the 
two are often subtle, and Lyotard even suggests that works may contain 
Lyotard on Postmodern Music 
Volume 5 Number 1 (2016)   127   
elements of both modern and postmodern aesthetics.  Yet in general, the 
difference seems to rest on the quotient of experimentation evident in the 
work:  the modern sublime is evoked by works which draw attention to the 
limits of traditional modes or representation, indicating negatively that a 
transcendent absolute exists but cannot be represented; by contrast, works 
which exhibit a postmodern aesthetic experiment with new modes of 
presentation, introducing an “unpresentable” element into the presentation 
itself.  In literature, Lyotard names Proust as an example of the modern 
sublime and Joyce as an example of the postmodern. 
The unpresentable is difficult for the mind to think, and Lyotard 
deliberately uses paradoxical terms to indicate it.  In his writings on music, 
“the inaudible” is signaled obliquely by appeal to literary references (Kleist, 
Quignard) and even a spiritual one (Swedenborg).28  Yet the “unpresentable” 
is not quite so mysterious as it might seem.  It is nothing mystical, as Lyotard 
insists, but rather indicates what it is in art that moves us; something which 
cannot be identified in or reduced to “ordinary perception,” to our knowledge 
of what the artwork is or represents, or to our understanding of the rules or 
principles governing its composition and effects.29  This is why Lyotard insists 
on using terms such as “invisible,” derived from Merleau-Ponty, and 
“inaudible,” suggested by Varèse.  At least in one important respect, the 
unpresentable is affect, that which moves the body and makes it feel not a 
recognizable emotion but unknown or unspecifiable feelings.  Moreover, the 
unpresentable is a state of matter and not immaterial or spiritual in a 
metaphysically transcendent sense.  Lyotard writes:  “The inaudible and the 
invisible do not belong to a supra-sensible substratum that escapes entirely 
the normal condition of space-time-matter … the inaudible is a gesture in the 
space-time-matter of sound, and it gestures toward a ‘presence’ that is not 
presentable.” 30 
 
5 
 
For Lyotard then, the meaning of the postmodern in the arts is linked to a 
modality of the aesthetic of the sublime, which insists on the immanence of 
the absolute in the matter of the work.  Although it is not explicitly stated, it 
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is not difficult to draw out the theme of the sublime in Lyotard’s essays on 
music from the 1980s.  We have seen that for him, the sublime is 
recognizable in arts which move away from form towards matter.  In music, 
he argues, the sublime is evident in 1) the way that music seeks to escape 
temporal form, and 2) timbre as the matter of music.  The first point 
identifies a general principle or logic which operates on two levels:  it is the 
principle of form in western music, which operates according to repetition. 
One level is that of the audible experience of music and concerns its 
composition.  On this level,  Lyotard identifies musics which have what he 
calls a narrative form:  they have a beginning, middle, and end, and they 
express and evoke recognizable moods, emotions, and feelings.  As examples 
of “narrative” types of music, Lyotard indicates “the musical poem, the 
symphony, the sonata, the lied.”31  By contrast, Lyotard will associate the 
aesthetic of the sublime with all kinds of experimental musics which defy 
such narrative form.  At a more profound level however, Lyotard argues that 
what is at stake in music — what gives rise to aesthetic feeling and makes it 
an art — is a “pure, punctual presence” that escapes from the repetitions 
which constitute the audible by giving it consistency and form.32  This level 
concerns the constitution of the audible as such and evokes the paradox of 
“the inaudible,” which is not directly experienceable but is that which in 
audible sound evokes aesthetic experience.  Lyotard approaches this difficult 
idea of a “pure, punctual presence” and tries to argue for it in a number of 
ways, which include the references to Kleist, Quignard, and Swedenborg 
mentioned above; but let us summarize the point via his more strictly 
philosophical, Kantian approach.33  
For Kant, space and time are the two basic forms of intuition, 
according to which objects are presented and become perceptible.  Music 
does not require space in order to be perceived; but it is par excellence the art 
of time.34  Kant understands “the given” — that which we perceive through 
the senses — as a manifold:  for him, the term “matter” designates this “pure 
diversity” before any ordering, before form.  In order to perceive objects, the 
mind must engage in an activity of synthesis, which gathers together the 
manifold and imposes on it a form.  In this way, the manifold can be 
presented as a sensible object and offered to the understanding for 
categorization.  Time is a form which allows the presentation or appearing of 
the perceptible through retention and repetition.  In order for something to 
appear even for an instant in perception, there must be at the bare minimum 
a “microsynthesis” of the manifold, a grasping and comparing of different 
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elements of the manifold, which requires a repetition because “past” 
elements must be repeated in order for such a comparison, such a synthesis, 
to take place.  In short, Lyotard posits that what gives the aesthetic feeling of 
the sublime in music may be theorized as escaping from repetition and the 
form of time and understood as “a pinch of manifold” so small that it is 
imperceptible to consciousness, unexperienceable, taking place below the 
threshold of perception.35  Sound in this immediate present would escape 
from the form of time and be something monstrous, unformed, 
unpresentable.  To use a term that is common in Lyotard’s work, an inaudible 
sound would be a sonic event:  that is, an occurrence irreducible to the 
systems of meaning, both perceptual and cognitive, that we try to capture it 
in.36 
Lyotard further associates the capacity of sound to produce such an 
event with matter understood as timbre, the tonal quality of a sound which 
differs for example when the same note is played on different instruments.  
Timbre is one of three main aspects of sound and the most difficult to 
determine precisely or understand rationally.  The other two aspects, pitch 
and volume, are relatively easy to understand in terms of objective 
quantitative measure and graded scales of subjective experience.  Simply 
put, pitch largely corresponds to the frequency of sound waves, and different 
pitches are heard as higher or lower in relation to each other.  Volume is 
measured physically as intensity, “the energy transmitted by the sound wave 
across unit area per second” and perceived by the listener on a comparative 
scale of louder or quieter.37  It is possible to analyze timbre in terms of the 
physical aspects of sound, but it is a far more complex matter.  Timbre is 
influenced by many factors in the production of sound, including the 
harmonic spectrum of the tone (its overtones), the starting transients (the 
time in which the sound vibration develops), the envelope shape (the 
changes in amplitude of the sound wave), and the formants (acoustic 
resonance factors) affecting the sound.  These last include the physical 
parameters of the ear and brain receiving the sound, which differ between 
individuals (deafness across a certain range, etc.), and as Charles Taylor and 
Murray Campbell note, “the result of all this is, of course, that the wave that is 
finally perceived by the brain may be very different from the one that started 
out from the basic vibrator.” 38  Subjectively, timbre is even more difficult to 
“rationalize” since it concerns quality rather than quantity.  The convention is 
to describe timbre as the “colour” of a tone, yet as Isabella van Elferen has 
noted, this is a synaesthetically confused metaphor, which describes sound 
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with a properly visual concept.39  Timbres are typically described using such 
synesthetic metaphors; timbres may be called “warm,” “red,” “grainy,” “clean,” 
etc.  This elusive aspect of timbre led Romantic music theorists such as 
Johann Gottfried Herder and E.T.A. Hoffmann to associate it with the infinite 
and indeed with the sublime.40 
For Lyotard, timbre is exploited as a “site” of the inaudible in sound, of 
the sonic event, by virtue of its indeterminacy.  In short, he believes that there 
is in timbre something irreducible to the well-known parameters of 
perception and rational analysis, and this something is the “je ne sais quoi” 
which is responsible for our aesthetic feeling of music.  He emphasizes the 
importance of timbre in avant-garde musics: 
 
It is clear too that from Debussy to Boulez, Cage or Nono, via Webern or Varèse, 
the attention of modern musicians has been turned towards this secret 
passibility to sound-timbre.  And it is also this that makes jazz and electronic 
music important.  For with gongs and in general all percussion instruments, with 
synthesizers, musicians have access to an infinite continuum of sound-
nuances.41 
 
This focus on the inaudible in music, understood as the unpresentable given 
in the present instant and the matter of timbre, explains why Lyotard links 
the aesthetic of the sublime with music.  This idea of the inaudible is also 
what allows us to characterize his philosophy of music as post-
phenomenological:  in music, the inaudible is what gives the given — the 
audible — but is not itself given.  In the later essay “Music, Mutic” (1993), 
using vocabulary typical of this later period, Lyotard describes music as a 
gesture made in space-time-sound, which makes a sign of the inaudible.42  
In the passage quoted above, Lyotard uses the special term 
“passibility” to describe the kind of state required in order to be receptive to 
sonic events in music.  Passibility is a state which involves both passivity and 
activity or ability:  the state is passive insofar as it requires us to be open to 
the unexpected and drop our expectations and anticipatory interpretations 
of what will be given to us in sensation and feeling — but active insofar as it 
requires careful attention directed toward such openness.  “Passibility” also 
enfolds the meaning of “passage” as it is a state in which one opens one’s 
sensibility as a passage through which the event may be registered on the 
receptive mind or “soul”:  “a passage to the events which come to it from a 
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‘something’ that it does not know.”43  Lyotard compares this state with the 
kind of free-floating attention required in the psychoanalytic exercise of “free 
association.”44  It is only through such a state of receptiveness that the 
inaudible in the audible might be “heard.”  
 
6 
 
Before we can conclude with a clear summary of what postmodern music 
would mean for Lyotard — a meaning that we have seen is linked with the 
aesthetic of the sublime — we must note that a significant complication is 
introduced into Lyotard’s understanding of the sublime around the same 
time as the “Music and Postmodernity” essay was written.  This complication 
is one which has only recently been made readily and clearly available with 
the 2009 publication in French and English of his contemporaneous book 
Karel Appel:  A Gesture of Colour, which was previously only available in 
German.  Here he writes as follows: 
 
It is foolish to pretend, or even to suppose, that each of these aesthetics, that of 
the beautiful and that of the sublime, rules a distinct period in the history of the 
arts or could be recognisable by a manner or an appropriate school.  Take for 
example the avant-gardes.  The art historian and the art critic distinguish there 
two major movements, one towards abstraction, the other towards the minimal. 
 
One could believe (this happened to me) that in both cases it is a question of 
attempting to forestall the trap of figuration and of bearing witness to that 
which escapes all presentation.  An attempt at “negative presentation,” as it 
were, that is obedient to an aesthetics of “too little to see,” that would turn its 
back on the free profusion, on the “rich matter” of forms.  One would thus 
recognise the sublime in certain manners. [ … ] 
 
That is a hasty application of the results of critical analysis to the description of 
works.  Minimalism and abstraction are names which designate, more or less, 
manners indeed observable in the history of art.  But the critical issues that 
interest us do not coincide at all with these manners. [ … ]  Above all, the sublime 
does not become attached to manner, it is without manner, as Longinus already 
suggested. [ … ]  There is no sublime technique because technique deals with the 
shaping of matter in presentation and the sublime is only the feeling that the 
absolute makes a sign in the work, whatever its form.  This “presence” signs itself 
as much [ … ] in a rondo of Mozart and in a quartet for strings by Beethoven or 
Scelsi.45 
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The upshot of this is that the late Lyotard in a certain sense retracts 
his claim that over the last two hundred years, and with the twentieth-
century avant-gardes in particular, art must be understood in relation to the 
aesthetic of the sublime, understandable as a movement away from form 
and towards matter, recognizable in stylistic movements such as minimalism 
and abstraction.  
A corollary displacement occurs with Lyotard’s treatment of music in 
his last essay dedicated to it, “Music, Mutic,” published in 1993.  Here, we see 
that while he continues to focus on matter as indeterminacy, opposed to 
form, timbre has now passed over to the side of form, of the presentation, of 
the audible.  Recall here my introductory comments on Lyotard’s 
methodological “doubt.”  He writes: 
 
There is a sonorous matter that is not what the musician calls the material.  The 
latter is understood as the timbre of the sound.  Matter is not heard [ … ] 
sonorous matter [ … ] clandestinely inhabits the audible material, the timbre.46 
 
The above points complicate our attempt to understand Lyotard’s 
ideas about postmodern music in important ways because he now suggests 
that the aesthetic feelings of the beautiful and the sublime cannot be 
distinguished in relation to the characteristics of the work — there is no 
sublime style, and timbre is placed on the side of form, not matter.  In this 
period of Lyotard’s aesthetics — the 1990s — he insists that there is no history 
of art properly speaking, only a history of the cultural reception of artworks, 
understood and classified according to their forms.47  There is no history of 
what gives a cultural product an artistic value, which for him is its capacity to 
affect us:  there is no history of the beautiful or the sublime, such that we 
would be able to say that for example a work by Matisse is more beautiful 
than one by Rembrandt because beauty has progressed.48   
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7 
 
Having completed this brief survey of some pertinent aspects of Lyotard’s 
philosophy of music, we may return to the question of whether there is an 
event analogous to the postmodern in the history of western music.  As 
previously noted, Lyotard says this is a naïve question, and we may now 
readily see why:  insofar as he wants to insist in his late aesthetics that there 
is no history of art, there is no history of the artistic effect in music.  The 
stylistic changes which determine periods of music — baroque, classical, 
romantic, modern, to name just the broadest and best-known — take place 
on the level of culture and of the presentation of the work.  What would be 
called “the postmodern” or “postmodernity” in music as in other fields must 
break with such a cultural history.  
However, there are some ways in which there is a plausible analogy 
between the postmodern event and music history.  We can see this 
elaborated in Lyotard’s essay “Obedience,” which appears in The Inhuman.  
The liberation of sound as material — something masterable which is used 
to produce specific aesthetic effects — might be thought to have revealed 
that sound is more (or perhaps less) than material; it is matter.  Matter in this 
sense is what Lyotard called “immaterial” at the exhibition of that name (Les 
Immatériaux), for which he was principal director at the Pompidou Centre in 
1985.  Here he presented the hypothesis of a kind of negative dialectic with 
respect to modernity, understood as the attempt to liberate humanity 
through the technological control of materials.  The very technoscientific 
researches which attempted to increase this mastery, he contended, have 
undermined it as it has broken down the distinction between subject and 
object which supported this project and the concept of the material, 
revealing an indeterminacy he names “immaterial matter.”49  Lyotard draws 
an explicit link between the themes of this exhibition and his reflections on 
music when he calls Varèse’s poème électronique — played at the Philips 
pavilion, designed by Le Corbusier, in Brussels in 1958 — the first exhibition 
of immaterials.50  What he calls sonorous matter is immaterial matter insofar as 
it involves this indeterminacy.  The “liberation of sound” has not revealed 
something masterable, a key to calculating determinable musical effects, 
but a vast heterogeneous continuum of indeterminate, possible effects.  The 
liberation of sound has revealed something indeterminate and 
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unmasterable just as the modern attempt to liberate “Man” has revealed that 
there is no such coherent subject of history. 
Despite Lyotard’s later qualifications, postmodern music would still 
be bound up with an aesthetic of the sublime.  In his later works, there are 
important aspects of the aesthetic of the sublime which he wants to 
generalize to all aesthetics.  This generalization is the explicit task of the 1993 
essay “Anima Minima,” where he writes: 
 
The present description extends the import of the specific analysis of the 
sublime sentiment to all aesthetic sentiments.  Being artists, writers, sometimes 
philosophers, contemporaries apply themselves to detecting within sensation 
the “presence” of what escapes sensation:  something neutral, something gray, 
something blank “inhabits” the nuances of a sound, a chromaticism, or a voice.51 
 
What Lyotard ultimately wants with the aesthetic of the sublime 
then seems to be what I have called the “post-phenomenological” aspect of 
his aesthetic — the “unpresentable presence,” not only irreducible to 
conceptual determination but also to formed perception.  He continues to 
identify this unpresentable presence with an immaterial matter even as the 
capacity to identify it in works which highlight timbre or color is now denied.  
The problem with Lyotard’s emphasis on timbre in music in the ‘80s is simply 
that it identifies “presence” too strongly with the presentation and restricts it 
too much to a particular style or period.  His later aesthetics further open the 
question of where “the inaudible” might be indicated through sound. 
It thus remains the case that Lyotard wants to elaborate and defend 
the sublime as an aesthetic which best describes the stakes of the arts he is 
interested in — that is, experimental arts.  Such arts might be called “avant-
garde,” not because they belong to a particular period or style but because 
they push the boundaries of the received rules of presentation through 
whatever manner or style in their search for the unpresentable.  Lyotard’s 
later considerations are not retractions of the sublime as an aesthetic of 
experimentation in the arts but rather of a too-easy historical periodization 
of such experimentation, which would recognize the sublime only in a 
particular manner or style.  “Musical postmodernity” then would not be a 
period but a state, mood, approach, realization, perspective, or aesthetic 
whereby one would not give credence to the notion that the cultural 
unfolding of periods or styles progressively liberates sound but would search 
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for the inaudible through any and all styles and parameters of 
experimentation.  There is in avant-garde music a vast multiplicity of 
experimental techniques pursued to approach the inaudible.  Lyotard gives 
just two examples to illustrate the range of these heterogeneous possibilities 
of experimentation; two composers, who seem to him to approach the 
inaudible from opposite directions:  Cage through “letting sound be” and 
Boulez through an “over-articulation” of sound.52  If there is a recognition of 
the legitimacy of multiple, heterogeneous, and perhaps incommensurable 
regions of sound able to testify to the inaudible, we have entered — in music 
— something like the political postmodernity which Lyotard conceives as the 
multiplication of little narratives once the grand narratives of the 
emancipation of humanity, which claimed to subsume them, have broken 
down.53 
While he argues for multiplicity and heterogeneity in music, 
however, this does not mean that Lyotard should be thought to have 
subscribed to the kind of postmodernism which denies any legitimate 
distinction between high art and populism such that for example Boulez’s 
music would appear to have equal artistic value to Taylor Swift’s.  Lyotard 
does deny that the “liberation of sound” takes place along the path of a single 
approach such as the atonalism of Schönberg and his followers.  However, he 
must be thought in a specific sense to continue to privilege the avant-garde 
as an “elite.”  Indeed, in an interview arranged as an exchange with Boulez, he 
asserts that “[e]litism, for my part, was never anything of which to be 
afraid.”54  In Lyotard’s specific sense, such an elitism is simply a lack of 
concern with popular accessibility.  But neither does Lyotard draw such a 
distinction along cultural lines, and he is happy to include Frank Zappa, Jimi 
Hendrix, Ravi Shankar, free jazz, and other musics and musicians who have 
found a popular cultural reception among those he would include in such an 
elite.55  Rather, the line of distinction would be the capacity to testify to or 
gesture towards the inaudible, something which can ultimately only be a 
matter of aesthetic judgment but which remains at least associated with the 
creation of new forms or experimentation with new materials — that is, the 
appearance of something new on the side of presentation.  Indeed, it is 
precisely the aesthetic of the sublime — understood as the search for “the 
inaudible” — which gives a specific character to Lyotard’s understanding of 
postmodern music and saves it from the generalized eclecticism without 
criteria that is often thought to follow from the breakdown of 
metanarratives.  
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In the final section of the essay “The Inaudible:  Music and 
Postmodernity,” Lyotard repeats the appeal to heterogeneity and warning 
against the danger of cultural monism which closes his essay “Answering the 
Question:  What is the Postmodern?”  Here, he uses the image of Babel, 
suggesting that the postmodern scene in music means the multiplicity of 
stylistic experimentations, which would accord with the multiplication of 
idioms after the tower’s destruction by God.56  He suggests that some want to 
metaphorically rebuild the tower by basing musics around recognizable and 
agreed-upon features such as harmony and rhythm.  Such rules, he suggests, 
are a kind of equal measure which are the sonic equivalent to money insofar 
as they equalize differences and impose a monolithic value under 
capitalism.  Yet the Lord, he insists, was wise to destroy the tower of Babel, 
and Lyotard asserts the value of multiple experimentations in music which 
push the limits of the audible so that it approaches the inaudible.  His 
argument then is analogous to the one he makes against so-called trans-
avant-gardism — the return to painting in the early ‘80s — that he makes in 
“Answering the Question.”  It is a plea for continued efforts in 
experimentation and musical invention, resisting desires to return to the 
recognizable and comfortable. 
We can now summarize the specific and nuanced sense in which we 
can understand postmodern music according to Lyotard.  Postmodernity in 
music must be understood as an approach which rejects the linear historical 
development which characterized modernism (and which applies only on 
the cultural level) and embraces a plurality of experimental approaches and 
procedures.  Postmodern music would be a search for the inaudible, for what 
Lyotard would consider the art in music, rather than an attempt to make 
cultural forms progress.  Insofar as it can be periodized, a musical 
postmodernity would refer only to a condition in which such an approach 
predominates.  Moreover, as we have seen, for Lyotard postmodern music is 
characterized by a sublime aesthetic.  Such an aesthetic must be understood 
not in terms of recognizable stylistic features but as indicating that aspect 
which Lyotard isolates and generalizes to all aesthetics:  the unpresentable 
in presentation, the matter in form, the inaudible in the audible.   
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